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The Unintended Federalism
Consequences of the Affordable
Care Act’s Insurance Market
Reforms
Joshua Phares Ackerman*
I.

Introduction

After the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) in 2010, the front lines in the political
controversy over the Act shifted from Washington to the
states.1 One of the ACA’s signature provisions was the creation
of health insurance marketplaces, termed “exchanges,” that
consumers can use to purchase coverage under the Act.2 Under
the banner of “state flexibility,” the ACA delegated authority to
set up and administer the exchanges to the states.3 The federal
government, however, is responsible for operating an exchange
in any state that does not create one of its own.4 The states’
role in creating exchanges provided a focal point for continued
political wrangling over the Act. Resisting the creation of an
exchange in their state became a cause célèbre among
Republican governors, who denounced the exchanges as an
encroachment on states’ rights.5 While refusing to set up an

* Law Clerk to the Honorable Paul J. Watford, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I am grateful to thank Rich Chen, John Major,
Anup Malani, Garett Rose, Graham Safty, and Julia Schwartz for their
helpful advice and comments on drafts of this Article. I would also like to
thank the editorial staff of the PACE LAW REVIEW for their work on this piece.
1. But see 40th Repeal Vote Unlikely To Be Charm for House
Republicans,
KAISER
HEALTH
NEWS
(Aug.
2,
2013),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2013/August/02/houserepeal-vote.aspx.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041 (2012).
3. See id.
4. Id. § 18041(c).
5. See Robert Pear, Majority of Governors Refuse to Set Up Health
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exchange may have political benefits, it also has a significant
impact on states’ regulatory authority under the ACA. Put
simply, those who opposed the creation of state exchanges as a
means of protesting the expansion of federal government may
have won a battle at the expense of losing a much larger war
over the scope of federal authority.
For the most part, the controversy over the exchanges
broke along predictable partisan lines. But in Mississippi, the
decision whether to create a state-run exchange bitterly
divided the state’s governor and insurance commissioner, both
of whom are Republicans. Like many of his GOP colleagues,
Governor Phil Bryant opposed the creation of an ACA
exchange, arguing that it would be “a portal to a massive and
unaffordable new federal entitlement program.”6 However,
Mike Chaney, the state’s elected insurance commissioner,
supported the creation of an exchange. Claiming that the
Governor was “full of crap,” Chaney argued that a state-run
exchange would allow Mississippi to maintain control over
health plan regulation.7 In Chaney’s view, a federally run
exchange would impede the state’s control over plan pricing,
selection, and distribution.8 Believing that he had authority
under state law to move forward independently, Chaney
submitted a plan for an exchange to the Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”).9 Governor Bryant wrote
Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A13; Louise Radnofsky, Six More
States Reject Role In Health-Care Exchanges, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324432004578306680100309
950.html?mod=mw_streaming_stream#articleTabs%3Darticle.
6. Governor Bryant Issues Statement on Health Care Exchange,
GOVERNOR
PHIL
BRYANT
(Feb.
7,
2013),
http://www.governorbryant.com/governor-bryant-issues-statement-on-healthcare-exchange/.
7. Geoff Pender, Mississippi Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney
Virtually
Alone,
Miffed,
CLARION-LEDGER
(Feb.
13,
2013),
http://www.clarionledger.com/article/20130120/COL0601/301200032/.
8. See Louise Radnofsky, State’s Health Exchange Rejected Amid GOP
Rift,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Feb.
8,
2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873249060045782922712
69356316; see also Caleb Bedillion, Chaney Outlines Health Care Future,
DAILYLEADER.COM (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:15 PM) (source on file with the author).
9. Chaney relied on an opinion from the state’s attorney general (a
Democrat) that concluded he had authority to submit the exchange
application. See Radnofsky, supra note 8.
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separately to HHS, stating that he was opposed to a state-run
exchange and would take steps to block it if HHS approved
Chaney’s application.10 HHS denied Chaney’s application,
citing “a lack of support from your Governor and no formal
commitment to coordinate from other state agencies” as the
basis of its decision.11 Chaney continues to maintain that the
federal exchange will be detrimental to the state, and that
Governor Bryant’s opposition to the exchange was rooted in
political, rather than policy, considerations.12
The family feud in the Mississippi GOP highlights an
unintended—and unexplored—consequence of federal health
reform. On their face, the exchange provisions of the ACA
purport to give states options. By allowing states to determine
whether to establish an exchange and how it should be run, the
Act vests a degree of control over the implementation of health
reform in the states. This delegation stands in contrast with
other provisions of the ACA, which impose federal standards in
areas traditionally subject to state regulatory authority.13 The
exchange provision seems an ideal compromise—states may
elect to establish an exchange under their own terms, or opt
into a set of federal default rules if they see fit. By this account,
the exchanges are a pro-federalism aspect of the ACA, in that
they preserve a prominent role for the states in regulating a
crucial component of federal health reform.
Developments since the passage of the ACA have cast
considerable doubt on this characterization of the exchanges as
protective of state regulatory authority. The exchanges have
become a political hot potato to be avoided by Republican
governors (and some of their Democratic counterparts) at all

10. See id.
11. Press Release, Mississippi Insurance Department, Official Statement
from Mississippi Insurance Commissioner Mike Chaney (Feb. 8, 2013),
available at http://www.mid.ms.gov/press_releases/2013/pressrel020813.pdf
(reproducing letter from Gary Cohen, Director of HHS Center for Consumer
Information and Insurance Oversight, to Chaney).
12. See Bedillion, supra note 8.
13. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2012) (prohibiting rescission of health
insurance policies); id. § 300gg-15 (preempting state disclosure requirements
that conflict with the ACA’s disclosure requirements); id. § 300gg-16
(prohibiting the use of employee salary as an eligibility criterion for joining a
group health plan).
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costs. Only twenty-four states (and the District of Columbia)
opted to create exchanges, leaving the other twenty-six states
with some form of a federal exchange.14
This political opposition to the exchanges comes at a
significant cost. Much of the ACA’s substantive regulation of
health insurance plans is tied to rules set and administered by
the exchanges; by opting not to create state-run exchanges,
states have ceded the ability to set these rules to the federal
government. Thus, by accident or by design, a provision that
purports to preserve a role for state regulation has stripped
states of a significant portion of their traditional prerogative to
regulate health insurance within their borders.
This Article, which is the first to examine the relationship
between the ACA’s insurance market reforms and state
regulation of insurance, argues that states’ decisions to forego
creating their own exchanges may mark the beginning of an
important shift of regulatory authority from the states to the
federal government. This shift will have broad consequences in
health care, effectively creating a new federal regulator with
authority to specify the products health insurers may sell, how
they may sell them, who must be able to purchase them, and
what they may charge.
Such a shift to greater federal regulation is a mistake.
State-based regulation of health insurance has a number of
advantages over a federal alternative. It provides greater
opportunity for regulatory experimentation, which is critical
given the lack of consensus regarding how best to solve the
cost-access-quality tradeoffs that plague American health care.
Moreover, health care is a local industry. A great deal depends
on the interaction between providers and insurers within a
local market, and state regulators are better suited to regulate
with sensitivity to these dynamics. State regulators also have
14. See What is the Marketplace in my State?, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-is-the-marketplace-in-my-state/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2014), for information on which states opted to create exchanges. Of
the states that elected to create an exchange, fifteen opted to share some of
the responsibility for operating their exchange with the federal government.
See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE ACT: STATUS OF CMS EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH
FEDERALLY FACILITATED HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES 3, 9-10, 14-15 (2013),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655291.pdf.
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superior institutional expertise in insurance regulation. At the
very least, it would be unwise to jettison state regulation, and
its accompanying benefits, without considering whether a
federal alternative would be superior. But the ACA’s exchange
provisions will result in exactly this sort of blindfolded
transformation.
The shift toward an increased federal role in health
insurance regulation may also have consequences beyond
health care markets. Specifically, it may open the door to
greater federal involvement in insurance regulation generally.
In recent years, insurance companies and scholars have begun
to question the States’ decades-old allocation role as the
primary regulators of insurance. Some have proposed creating
an alternative scheme based on federal chartering of insurance
carriers. These proposals have touched off a broader debate
about the propriety of state-based insurance regulation.15 The
federal exchange may be a test run of sorts for such a program,
and if it overcomes its initial hiccups,16 could generate further
momentum for federal chartering. But proponents of regulatory
reform in non-health insurance markets should not rush to
trumpet the ACA as a model regulatory structure. As the result
of states’ unexpected reaction to the exchange provisions, the
ACA’s allotment of regulatory authority is haphazard, and not
the product of deliberative institutional design. Any reform in
other markets should be informed by a debate—which was
sorely lacking in the ACA context—about the pros and cons of
federal regulation.
The Article begins by sketching the historical antecedents
15. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarranFerguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role of Insurance Regulation,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 18-20 (1993) (arguing that the basic structure of
insurance regulation is sound, and proposing modest reforms); Susan
Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 625, 664-69, 686-87 (1999) (arguing that traditional federalism
arguments do not justify state regulation of insurance); Daniel Schwarcz,
Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against
Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1708-11, 171617 (2010) (discussing proposals to reform insurance regulation, and arguing
that proponents of reform overstate the benefits of regulatory competition).
16. See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Ian Austen, & Sharon LaFraniere, Tension and
Flaws Before Health Website Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, at A1.
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of the current allocation of state and federal authority over
insurance regulation. The aim of this discussion is to highlight
the unique role states play in the regulation of insurance as
opposed to other financial products. Part III explains the preACA structure of health insurance regulation. It discusses both
the objectives of health insurance regulation and the
substantive and institutional frameworks states have evolved
to meet those objectives. Part III also explains the reasons why
states are well suited to regulate health insurance. Before
turning to the regulatory structure introduced by President
Obama’s health reforms, Part IV explains the federal
government’s involvement in health plan regulation before the
ACA. Part V details the relevant ACA provisions, explaining
the new rules that will apply to health plans and carriers. It
pays special attention to the application of these rules—some
apply to all health plans, regardless of how they are sold, while
others apply only to plans sold through the exchanges. These
latter rules are particularly important to this Article’s analysis,
as they represent the regulatory functions that the federal
government will assume—via its exchange—in states that elect
not to create exchanges. Part VI explores the effect the ACA’s
exchange rules will have on the balance of state and federal
regulatory authority, and highlights how the opt-in character
of the exchanges will alter this balance. Lastly, it offers
observations about the impact increased federal regulation of
health insurance may have on the regulation of other lines of
insurance.
II. Insurance Regulation as a Core State Competency
Insurance is unique among financial services industries in
that it is the only industry subject to plenary state regulation.17
Other financial services firms, including commercial banks,
investment banks, securities firms, and broker-dealers are all
subject to some form of federal regulatory authority. This Part
first explains the historical development of states’ role as the
primary regulator of the insurance. It then turns to a

17. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, COSTLY POLICIES: STATE
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN INSURANCE MARKETS 1 (1993).
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discussion of the competencies state regulators have developed
in this capacity.
A. Insurance Regulation and the States: A Brief History
The states’ role in insurance regulation is rooted in the
Supreme Court’s historical interpretation of the Commerce
Clause. The insurance business was originally a local concern.
The first firms to offer insurance policies were local and
regional fire and life carriers, which were often formed as local
stock companies or associations set up for the purpose of
providing mutual protection for their members.18 As one would
expect, these local entities were chartered by state
governments.
As the business expanded and carriers began to operate
across state lines, these local licensing regimes became a
subject of dispute. In Paul v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to Virginia’s licensure regime brought
by an out-of-state individual who wished to operate as an
insurance broker in Virginia.19 Paul, the plaintiff, challenged
Virginia’s decision not to allow him to operate in the state even
though he complied with all of its regulatory requirements
except a bond deposit provision.20 The Court held that
insurance contracts—which were the objects of the state
regulations—were not articles of interstate commerce, and that
the dormant Commerce Clause therefore did not limit state
authority over them.21 Thus, insurance contracts were within
the states’ exclusive control, and states were accordingly free to
use this power to regulate the business of insurance as they
saw fit. This understanding of insurance contracts as a state

18. See Robert W. Klein, The Insurance Industry and Its Regulation: An
Overview, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
13, 13-16 (Martin F. Grace & Robert W. Klein eds., 2009).
19. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 168-69 (1869).
20. Id. at 169.
21. Id. at 183. A second strand of the Court’s holding related to the
constitutional protections owed to corporations. The Court held that
corporations are not citizens for constitutional purposes, and that states were
therefore free to set licensing conditions as they saw fit. See id. at 177, 181.
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concern persisted for nearly a century.22
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Association.23 That case arose
from an indictment filed against South-Eastern Underwriters
Association (“South-Eastern”) alleging violations of the
Sherman Act. The indictment charged that the association had
engaged in conspiracies in restraint of trade and attempted
monopolization.24 South-Eastern’s only defense was that it was
not subject to the Sherman Act because its business—
insurance—was not “trade or commerce” among the states.25
South-Eastern argued that the entire business of insurance,
including interstate transactions, was beyond the reach of the
Commerce Clause and, therefore, the Sherman Act.26
South-Eastern’s argument forced the Court to squarely
confront—for the first time—whether Congress had the
authority to regulate interstate insurance transactions. The
Court characterized the prior cases on the subject, including
Paul, as dealing with the related but distinct question of
whether the Dormant Commerce Clause permitted the states to
regulate interstate insurance transactions.27 The Court held
that the regulation of interstate insurance contracts was within
the scope of the Commerce Clause power and that the Sherman
Act applied to the insurance industry.28
South-Eastern Underwriters threatened the structure of
insurance regulation that had prevailed for nearly a century.
In response to the decision, Congress quickly passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which substantially returned the
allocation of regulatory authority to the pre-South-Eastern

22. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Cnty., 231 U.S. 495 (1913), aff’g
Paul, 75 U.S. 168; Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895), aff’g Paul, 75
U.S. 168.
23. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
24. See id. at 534-35 (summarizing the claims under sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act). In an interesting twist, the indictment alleged that the
terms of the conspiracies were “policed,” i.e., enforced, “by inspection and
rating bureaus in five . . . states, together with local boards of insurance
agents.” Id. at 536.
25. Id. at 536.
26. See id. at 537-38.
27. See id. at 544-45.
28. See id. at 553, 561.
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Underwriters status quo.29 The Act reflected Congress’
judgment that the regulation of insurance should remain with
the states: “[T]he continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public
interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall not be
construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such businesses by the several States.”30 In support of this
judgment, the Act contained a unique reverse-preemption
provision that nullifies federal statutes insofar as they conflict
with state regulations.31 The basic structure put in place by
McCarran-Ferguson persists to this day. Although Congress
has removed some powers from the states,32 the vast majority
of insurance regulation is state imposed.
B. State Insurance Regulation Competencies
State insurance regulations exhibit considerable breadth
and complexity. Generally speaking, however, the regulations
fit into three broad categories—solvency, rate regulation, and
market conduct. A brief summary of the types of regulations
states impose in these areas, as well as their justifications, is
useful to set the stage for an exploration of health-insurancespecific regulations.
Protecting the insured public from the risks posed by
insolvent insurers was one of the earliest state interventions
into the insurance business, and the motivating force behind
the creation of state insurance regulators.33 The need for

29. See MACEY & MILLER, supra note 17, at 12; JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN,
REGULATING THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 27 (2010); see
also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946) (“Obviously
Congress’ purpose [in passing McCarran-Ferguson] was broadly to give
support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the
business of insurance.”).
30. McCarran-Ferguson Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012).
31. Id. § 1012(b).
32. For examples of where Congress has increased federal regulatory
authority over health insurance, see infra Part IV.
33. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 168 (1869) (discussing Virginia’s
solvency regulations); EDWIN WILHITE PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PRACTICE 192 (1927).

9

282

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

solvency regulation is clear. Because they have no personal
assets at risk, insurance company managers may not be
properly incentivized to ensure that the carrier’s financial
reserves are sufficient to pay out any claims that members may
make.34 Put differently, managers will be tempted to draw on
the carrier’s financial reserves to cover their own salaries and
perquisites, which may risk the carrier’s ability to fulfill its
policy commitments. Consumers, for their part, have little
means of scrutinizing the solvency of different carriers.35 By
the time there is a readily observable solvency problem with a
carrier, it may be too late for consumers to arrange alternate
coverage. Thus, state solvency standards both reduce the
incentive difficulty and counter the information asymmetry
faced by consumers.
Solvency is regulated by the carrier’s state of domicile.36
Typically, states require that carriers hold specified amounts of
fixed and risk-based capital, and regulate the kinds of
investments carriers may make.37 These regulations, however,
do not appear to be especially burdensome—carriers tend to
maintain capitalization levels well above regulatory
minimums.38 As a backstop in the event of a carrier’s failure,
states also maintain guaranty associations designed to honor
the claims of insolvent carriers.39
Rate regulation is the second major area of state insurance

34. See Klein, supra note 18, at 27.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 39. States vary considerably in terms of the relative
proportion of in-state business that is written by carriers domiciled in other
states. See id. at 20, 25 (reporting data on the percentage of each state’s
property-casualty and life-health premiums written by out-of-state carriers).
Other states may provide supplemental requirements beyond those required
by the carrier’s state of domicile. Echoing the debate from the corporate
chartering context, some have argued that the domicile system has
precipitated a regulatory race to the bottom. See id. at 39. Note that some
commentators have suggested that carrier solvency regulation is motivated in
part by fear of panics that resemble those in other financial industries. It is
not clear, however, that the business of insurance poses the same risk of
panic found in other financial industries like banking. See id.
37. See id. at 39.
38. See id. at 18-19 & n.12.
39. See id. at 40.
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oversight.40 Interestingly, rate regulation also began as a
solvency measure.41 Rate regulation works in tandem with
solvency regulation, as it ensures that carriers charge
premiums sufficient to cover their policy commitments.42
Today, many states also use rate regulation as a means of
ensuring access to coverage—rate review allows carriers to
make sure that rates are not “too high” and do not
unacceptably discriminate between consumers.43 Although the
justifications for rate regulation are disputed,44 proponents of
these regulations defend them on the ground that free market
price competition does not function properly in the insurance
industry because consumer search costs are high.45 The
stringency of rate regulation, which generally involves the
definition of permissible rating factors (i.e., the variables that
carriers may use to price their products) and direct state
review of the actual rates charged by plans—tends to vary with
the sophistication of the buyer.46 Accordingly, rate regulation in
some markets, like the market for individual health insurance,
is much more stringent than in others, such as the market for
commercial liability policies.
The third major area of state insurance regulation relates
to the market conduct of insurers. Rules in this area encompass
the approval of policy forms and terms, restrictions on
marketing content, and claims processing and adjustment.47
Importantly, these regulations also insurance agents and
brokers, which are an important distribution channel.48 The
justifications for market-conduct regulation are familiar. The

40. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of state rate
regulations in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
41. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 639 (2d ed. 2008).
42. See id.; see also Klein, supra note 18, at 28-29.
43. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 23.
44. See Robert E. Litan & Phil O’Connor, Consumer Benefits of an
Optional Federal Charter: The Case of Auto Insurance, in THE FUTURE OF
INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 145, 148-62
(assessing the impact of certain states’ rate deregulation programs on
consumers).
45. See Klein, supra note 18, at 29.
46. See id. at 40-41.
47. See Klein, supra note 18, at 30.
48. See id. at 41.
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regulations are intended to counter the effects of information
asymmetries, consumer financial illiteracy, and the superior
bargaining position of carriers.49
To summarize, more than 150 years of state insurance
regulation has left states with a set of core regulatory
competencies that apply, generally speaking, across all lines of
insurance. Over roughly the past sixty years, these core
regulatory functions have been adapted and applied to the
special problems posed by health insurance. The next Part
explores these health-specific regulations.
III. State Health Insurance and HMO Regulation before the
ACA
States have taken the lead role in regulating health
insurance plans since they became common in the 1930s. From
the outset, state regulation of health plans has sought to
balance the competing aims of making health coverage
affordable and ensuring that it is widely available—even to
those whose health status makes them expensive to insure.
Achieving these aims is not a straightforward task. Over time,
states have developed rules that regulate nearly every aspect of
the health insurance business, from the pricing of plans, to how
they may be sold, to what they must contain. The tapestry of
state regulations shows that while states agree on the basic
mechanisms used to regulate plans, they disagree as to
precisely how much regulation is required to create acceptable
health plan markets.
This Part highlights, in broad terms, the depth and
diversity of state health plan regulation. The goal is not to
provide a comprehensive description of the regulatory
landscape, but rather to highlight the intricacy and diversity of
state regimes. It is important to understand the regulatory
diversity in this area, because it represents precisely what is
49. See id. at 30 (discussing these problems in the context of property,
life, and casualty insurance); see also Patricia A. Butler, The Current Status
of State and Federal Regulation, in REGULATING MANAGED CARE: THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND FUTURE OPTIONS 29, 32-33 (Stuart H. Altman, Uwe E.
Reinhardt, & David Schactman eds., 1999) (discussing these issues in the
health insurance context).
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valuable about a state-based regulatory system. It encourages
regulatory experimentation, which is particularly useful in the
health insurance context because of the zero-sum tradeoff
between cost, quality of care, and access to care. And it affords
both carriers and consumers a degree of choice. Carriers can
choose not to do business in states with overly burdensome
regulatory schemes. Consumers also benefit, in that it is much
easier to influence local regulators’ actions than to influence
national health care policy. As subsequent parts of the Article
make clear, the ACA threatens this diversity.
The discussion in this Part begins with a brief history of
the development of health insurance and early state regulatory
approaches. It then explains the institutional structure of state
health plan regulation before turning to the substance of the
regulations themselves. It concludes with a brief discussion of
the merits of state-based regulation.
A. The Emergence of Health Insurance and Its Early
Regulation
Health insurance is a relatively recent phenomenon. It was
unusual before 1930, and only became widespread after World
War II.50 Accordingly, the regulatory regime governing other
lines of insurance was in place well before health insurance
became a significant regulatory concern.51 As is the case with

50. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION
FINANCE 195-96 (4th ed. 2001). In the early 1930s, health care costs
began to rise significantly in response to improvements in care quality and
increasing physician market power. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 258-60, 295 (1982). Significantly,
these cost increases did not affect all patients equally. See id. at 259-60.
Those who faced hospitalization or other serious illnesses faced significant
expenses, sometimes amounting to 30 to 50 percent of their annual income.
See id. at 260. Those in better health, however, incurred only a fraction of
this cost. Health insurance offered a solution to this high variation in
expenses by providing a means to spread the risk of health care costs across
the population. See id. at 258-60.
51. The development of health insurance lagged that of other forms of
insurance partly because of the high costs, adverse selection, and significant
moral hazards associated with health insurance. See STARR, supra note 50, at
294. Carriers partially solved these problems by moving to a model of
employer enrollment, which allowed them to secure a larger risk pool. See id.
AND
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other insurance products, the structure of health insurance
regulation is in part a function of the product’s historical
development. Early health insurance plans closely resembled
traditional forms of indemnity insurance—consumers would
pay a premium in exchange for a promise that the carrier
would reimburse them for certain expenses.52 In these early
plans, carriers exercised no oversight over consumers’ decisions
to seek care, and did not contract directly with providers.53
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their similarity to other lines of
insurance, states regulated these early plans much like other
indemnity products.54
This early regulatory regime distinguished between Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans—which were hospital-sponsored
and physician-sponsored health plans—and plans offered by
commercial health insurers.55 This distinction reflected
differences in the way these entities initially priced their
products; the “Blues” plans used community rating,56 while
commercial
carriers
used
experience rating.57
This
classification persists, in varying forms, in some modern state
regulatory regimes.58
During the 1970s, a new form of health insurance
52. 3 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 1:7 (2010); see STARR,
supra note 50, at 291-92.
53. See STARR, supra note 50, at 291.
54. See id. at 297 (discussing New York’s decision to regulate hospital
service plans like insurers).
55. See id. at 297, 306-07 (discussing Blue Cross plans’ efforts to secure
exemption from general insurance regulations like reserve requirements, and
the emergence of physician-led Blue Shield plans in response to restrictive
state regulation of cooperative health plans).
56. Community-rated policies are priced based on the expected claims of
the entire pool of those insured. See id. at 329. Experience-rated policies are
priced based on the claims (actual or expected) of each individual member of
the risk pool. See id.
57. FURROW ET AL., supra note 50, at 195-96. Under this regime, the
Blues plans received more favorable regulatory treatment, but were subject
to special rules of incorporation that limited their activities. See id.; see also
STARR, supra note 50, at 298, 328-29 (cataloging the spread of Blues-specific
regulation, and describing its effect on the Blues’ ability to compete with
commercial carriers). Note that by the end of the 1950s, Blues plans had also
begun to use experience rating. See STARR, supra note 50, at 330.
58. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1201 (West 2013) (exempting
“nonprofit health care corporations” from general insurance laws as part of a
separate regulatory scheme applicable to these entities).
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emerged. Health maintenance organizations (“HMOs” or
“managed care plans”) gained popularity following the passage
of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.59 The
economic model of HMO plans differs markedly from that of
indemnity plans. In an HMO plan, the consumer pays the
carrier a fixed fee up-front, and the carrier then arranges and
directly pays for all covered care that patient requires.60
Importantly, HMO plans perform a number of other functions
designed to control the cost of the care they provide. First, they
play a gatekeeping role, often termed “prior authorization.”
Prior authorization programs require that patients seek the
plan’s approval before receiving care.61 This reduces the
significant moral hazard problems that would arise if patients
could freely consume care at no marginal cost to themselves.
Second, HMO plans generally maintain a limited network of
providers. By agreeing to channel their members to these
providers, the plans are able to secure concessions in the price
of care.62 The care management functions pioneered by HMOs
represent the biggest difference between health insurance and
other forms of insurance, which led some states to create
separate regulators for health plans.
B. The Institutional Structure of Modern Health Plan
Regulation
States have adopted different approaches to the
institutional design question of whether to consolidate the
regulation of health plans and other forms of insurance in a
single agency.
Many states choose to vest regulatory authority over

59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to 300e-14a (2012); see FURROW ET AL., supra note
50, at 196.
60. See Jacob S. Hacker & Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think about
“Managed Care”, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 661, 666-75 (1999), for a discussion
of the relationship between HMOs and other forms of health insurance.
61. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 627-31 (5th ed. 2004) (explaining various forms of utilization
controls used by managed care organizations) [hereinafter FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW].
62. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 50, at 198, 201.
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health plans in the state insurance commissioner.63 Means of
selecting insurance commissioners vary significantly by state.
Eleven states elect their insurance commissioners.64 In twentynine states, the insurance commissioner is a gubernatorial
appointee, and in the remaining states, a subordinate executive
official or committee chooses the commissioner.65 Some states
require that insurance commissioners have prior experience in
the business of insurance.66 The status and importance of
insurance commissioners relative to other executive branch
officials also varies by state. There is wide variation in the size
and budget of state insurance departments.67
As an alternative to vesting authority to regulate health
plans with the insurance commissioner, some states have a
separate agency charged with this responsibility.68 Usually
called departments of managed care or health, the directors of

63. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1405/1405-5 (LexisNexis 2013)
(granting the insurance commissioner authority to execute and administer all
laws under chapter 215 of the Illinois code, which includes health insurance
and HMO regulation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-1-101 (West 2013) (conferring
“presumed” jurisdiction over “any person or other entity which provides
coverage . . . for medical . . . expenses, whether such coverage is by direct
payment, reimbursement, or otherwise” to the State Department of
Insurance); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 31.002, 843.151 (West 2013) (granting the
insurance department regulatory authority over the business of insurance
generally and HMOs specifically).
64. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 42; see also 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS, 2011 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES REPORT 2 (2012),
available at http://naic.softlinkliberty.net/liberty/libraryHome.do (search
“insurance department resources report”). For a summary of the debate about
the propriety of electing versus appointing insurance commissioners, see
JUSTIN L. BRADY ET AL., THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE 65-66 (1995).
65. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 42; see also BRADY ET AL., supra
note 64, at 64.
66. See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 31.023 (West 2013).
67. See BRADY ET AL., supra note 64, at 74-77.
68. See, e.g., Knox-Keene Health Care Services Plan Act of 1975, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1341, 1345(f) (Deering 2013) (creating the
Department of Managed Health Care, charged with regulating “[a]ny person
who undertakes to arrange for the provision of health care services . . . , or to
pay for or to reimburse any part of the cost for those services, in return for a
prepaid or periodic charge”); see also 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 991.2102,
991.2181 (West 2013) (allocating shared authority for the regulation of health
plans to the Departments of Insurance and Health); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 23-17.13-2 to 23-17.13-4 (West 2013) (conferring authority to regulate
health plans on the department of health).
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these departments are appointed officials.69
C. The Substance of State Health Plan Regulation
Health insurance is a heavily regulated industry. States
impose a wide range of rules and restrictions on insurers’
conduct, and even before the ACA, insurers were also subject to
a number of federal statutes.70 Broadly speaking, state
regulations of health insurers can be grouped into four
categories: rules affecting underwriting and rating practices,
rules governing market conduct, rules regulating the content of
plans (including coverage requirements, provider contracting
requirements, and regulation of utilization management
techniques), and rules applicable to insurance agents and other
producers. This section will explain the substantive content of
each of these sets of state regulations, drawing on the regimes
of several states as examples.
1. Health Plan Regulation and Group Size
State regulation of health plans varies by the size of the
insured group.71 State rating regulation, for example, is most
stringent in the market for “small-group” and individual health
plans. Small-group plans are typically defined as those offered
to employers with between two and fifty enrolled employees.72
Individual plans are those available for purchase directly by
consumers, and offer coverage only for an individual and his or
her family.
There are a number of reasons why states regulate the
small-group and individual markets more stringently. First,
because small groups have fewer members, it is more difficult

69. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1341; 71 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 67.1.
70. See infra Part IV.
71. Since most health insurance plans are employer provided, groups are
typically composed of a given employer’s employees.
72. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357(l)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38a-564(4) (West 2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/351B-3 (West
2013); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 31-101(z)(1) (West 2013); TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 1501.002(14) (West 2013).
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for carriers to spread the risk of loss across the group. One
chronically ill employee can incur significant enough medical
expenses so as to make the entire employee group unprofitable
for the carrier. Accordingly, left to their own devices, carriers
would have a very strong incentive to aggressively price
discriminate between small groups. Doing so would allow them
to charge sicker employees more than their peers, or, perhaps
more likely, perhaps setting rates so high as to make coverage
unaffordable for the group.
A similar dynamic is present in the individual market. If
carriers were to price their individual health plans to
accurately reflect the health risk of each potential purchaser,
many individuals would be excluded from the market. Carriers
would have no reason to offer an affordable plan to a sick
individual, preferring instead to focus on healthier consumers.
Accordingly, state regulations in the individual market attempt
to force carriers to distribute health risks across the entire pool
of individual policyholders as a means of facilitating access. In
sum, in both the small-group and the individual markets,
allowing carriers to rate their products as they wish would
have an adverse effect on access to health coverage,73 and most
states have thus intervened to prevent this outcome.74
A second reason state regulation is more stringent in the
small-group context is that federal law effectively preempts
state regulation of larger group plans. Once a group reaches a
certain size—typically around 250 members—it becomes
economical for the group to self-insure.75 Self-insuring
employers simply collect premiums from their employees, and
pay for losses with corporate funds. These employers generally
contract with an insurance carrier or a third-party
administrator to provide claims processing and other services,
73. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 50, at 261.
74. Note that not all states have imposed rating restrictions, and the
content of the restrictions varies considerably from state-to-state. See infra
note 93.
75. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. ET AL., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2012
ANNUAL
SURVEY
167
(2012),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-employerhealth-benefits-annual-survey-full-report-0912.pdf (reporting that 81 percent
of firms with more than two hundred employees are at least partially selfinsured).
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and may contract with an insurance carrier to provide coverage
for catastrophic losses. ERISA preempts state regulation of
these self-insurance arrangements, effectively clearing states
from the field.76
2. Restrictions on Rating and Underwriting
States play a significant role in determining the pricing of
health insurance products through their regulation of rating
and underwriting. Rating is the process by which an insurance
carrier assesses the risk involved with issuing a given type of
policy.77 When rating a policy, the carrier assesses the effect
that policyholder attributes are likely to have on the medical
expenses the policyholder is likely to incur. For example, the
carrier will calculate how much more it is likely to pay in
claims to cover a sixty-five year old versus a twenty-five year
old. At the end of the rating process, a carrier’s actuaries will
have developed a baseline premium for a given policy, along
with a set of adjustments associated with the specific attributes
of the policyholder. Underwriting is the process of soliciting
information about a prospective policyholder, and using this
information to calculate an individual premium based on those
rating factors. Together, rating and underwriting establish the
price of a given policy.
Virtually every aspect of small-group rating is subject to
state regulation. Most broadly, many states dictate that
carriers must use community rating rather than experience
rating for small-group products.78 That is, carriers must
calculate the expected losses, and consequently the premium,
based on the claims experience of all the small groups they
cover, not based on any one small employer group. This rule
76. See infra Part IV.B.
77. See PLITT ET AL., supra note 52, at § 1:3.
78. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.13 (Deering 2013);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-567(5) (West 2013); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 151205 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-25 (West 2013); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3231(a)(1) (McKinney 2013); cf. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1501.202 to
1501.205 (West 2013) (implementing a similar system whereby carriers
establish a limited number of “classes of business,” not based on group size,
calculate an “index rate” for each, and then are allowed to charge rates to
individual groups that vary by a fixed percentage from the index rate).
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has the effect of spreading claims risk across all employer
groups enrolled in a given product, rather than only across a
single employer’s employees.79 Not all states, however, require
community rating, and the specific rules vary between the
states that do.80
States also impose an overall cap on the profitability of
small-group health plans. The most common means of imposing
such a cap is the imposition of a minimum “medical loss ratio.”
This ratio is effectively a cap on the plan’s gross margin; it
dictates that the plan must pay out a certain percentage of its
premiums in the form of reimbursement for medical care. As
discussed in more detail below, although the ACA mandates
that states impose minimum medical loss ratios, such
regulations were common before Congress passed the ACA.81
Beyond specifying rating methods and minimum medical
loss ratio, states impose a grab bag of other restrictions on
rating practices designed to make coverage more broadly
affordable. These measures vary considerably from state to
state. The following paragraphs draw on California’s KnoxKeene Health Care Services Plan Act to illustrate the depth
typical of state rating regulation. Note, however, that
California is not perfectly representative of other states given
the diversity of approaches from state to state.

79. Community rating is not, however, a panacea for the access problems
that plague health insurance markets. While it makes coverage more
affordable for certain high-risk individuals, it also increases the cost of
coverage for all individuals in the risk pool. Therefore, it has the effect of
preventing those who cannot bear these higher costs from obtaining coverage.
This conundrum is one of the concerns that motivated the ACA.
80. See Small Group Health Insurance Market Rate Restrictions, KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/small-group-raterestrictions/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Small Group Rate
Restrictions].
81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.411 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62A.021 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-25(g)(2) (West 2013); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 3231 (McKinney 2013). Before the passage of the ACA, California
imposed an effective cap on the profitability of health plans by capping
administrative expenses—which include salaries—as a percentage of
premium. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1378 (West 2008). California
currently mandates that plans offered to small groups have a medical loss
ratio of at least 80 percent. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.003(a)(2)
(West 2013).
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In addition to requiring community rating,82 California
imposes the following restrictions on small-group rating. First,
the price charged to a given group may be only 10 percent
higher or lower than that charged to other small groups
enrolled in the same plan.83 This 10 percent variation, in turn,
may only be dictated by the age of the plan members, their
geographic location, their family composition (i.e., whether they
have dependents and spouses), and the employees’ benefit
choices.84 Even within these permissible rating factors, carriers
are limited in how they may use the factors to adjust
premiums. Adjustments based on age must be made using
specified age bands, and carriers may only make family-size
adjustments based on marital status and number of children.85
For geographic adjustments, carriers are allowed to define nine
regions within California, which must be of a certain minimum
size, and may only adjust premium rates based on these nine
regions.86 Moreover, carriers may adjust the risk premium
associated with each of these factors only once every six
months.87 These rating restrictions apply to both new business
and renewals. Price increases upon renewal may not exceed 10
percent, and carriers may make such adjustments only once
per year.88 Plans must disclose all risk-based adjustments to
the employer.89 Lastly, any rate changed must be filed with the
state Department of Managed Care sixty days before of taking
effect.90 The Department has the power to review the rates for
compliance with the law, may reject noncompliant rate
changes, and may also take limited actions against rate
changes it deems “unjustified.”91
In sum, California exercises a fine degree of control over
82. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.13.
83. See id. § 1357.12.
84. See id. § 1357(k).
85. See id. § 1357(k)(1)-(2).
86. See id. § 1357(k)(3).
87. See id. §§ 1357(h), 1357.12(3).
88. See id. § 1357.12(b).
89. See id. § 1357.14(a).
90. See id. § 1385.03(a)(1).
91. See id. § 1385.11. The statute empowers the Department to post
information about “unjustified” rate increases to its public website, and must
report such “unreasonable” increases to the state legislature. See id.
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pricing in the small-group market. This regulation increases
the availability of affordable coverage to small groups, but
comes at the cost of reduced price competition and,
consequently, higher premiums for many groups. This degree
of regulation is typical. California has similarly stringent (if
not more so) standards governing the individual market.92
Other states maintain similar regimes designed to increase
availability by forcing carriers to spread risk.93 Importantly,
however, states differ in terms of how carriers are expected to
spread claims risk across small groups. Illinois, for example,
allows carriers to define classes of small employers based on
how the carrier markets its plans, and carriers are permitted to
rate these classes separately.94
3. Restrictions on Market Conduct
In addition to regulating the pricing of health plans, states
impose broad restrictions on how carriers may sell their plans.
Generally speaking, these market-conduct rules specify the
terms on which carriers must make their plans available to
employers and the general public, the means by which carriers
market their plans, and the circumstances in which carriers
may terminate or refuse to renew coverage.
California’s market-conduct regulations for small-group
plans again provide an instructive example. Carriers must
market their plans to all small employers in their service
area;95 they may not, for example, focus their marketing efforts

92. See id. §§ 1399.801 to 1399.818.
93. For examples of small-group rating regulation, see CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38a-567 (West 2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 93/1–93/99 (West
2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-25(a)(3) (West 2013); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3231
(McKinney 2013); see also Small Group Rate Restrictions, supra note 80
(summarizing small-group market rating restrictions by state). For examples
of individual market rating restrictions, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a481; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 97/25, 97/50; N.J. STAT. § 17B:27A-25(a)(3); see
also Individual Market Rate Restrictions (Not Applicable to HIPAA Eligible
Individuals),
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.,
http://kff.org/other/stateindicator/individual-market-rate-restrictions/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014)
(summarizing individual market rating restrictions by state).
94. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 93/20, 93/25.
95. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.03(a)(1).
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on certain industries. Nor can carriers circumvent this rule by
contracting with third parties tasked with soliciting business
based on designated characteristics,96 or by encouraging
undesirable clients to seek coverage elsewhere.97 Similarly, all
plans that the carrier offers to small groups must be made
available to all employers.98 Once a small employer applies for
coverage, the carrier is obliged to provide it so long as the
employer agrees to offer the benefits to all its employees,
agrees to make payments, agrees to inform employees of
enrollment periods, and certifies that its employees reside in
the service area.99 Moreover, carriers must use the same
employee contribution requirements, copays, and premiums for
all small-group plans.100 Plans are also subject to disclosure
requirements, both to the employer and to the state.101
In addition to the market-conduct requirements that apply
at the level of the sponsoring employer, carriers are subject to
restrictions that apply at the level of the individual plan
member. California’s regulation of the small-group market
establishes a general rule that once a carrier offers coverage to
an employer group, it must cover all the members of that group
that elect to join the plan.102 In other words, carriers cannot set
eligibility rules based on an employee’s health status,
preexisting conditions, past claims experience, genetics, or
disabilities.103 In addition to these health-status restrictions,
carriers cannot permanently exclude employees from a plan
based on their failure to join during an annual enrollment
period, although they may exclude them for that year.104 Other
states have similar rules.105

96. See id. § 1357.03(e).
97. See id. § 1357.03(d).
98. See id. § 1357.03(a)(2).
99. See id. § 1357.03(c); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176G, § 6A
(West 2013).
100. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1357.03(b).
101. See id. § 1357.14 (outlining disclosure requirements that plans
must make to prospective purchasers); id. § 1357.03(b) (mandating
disclosures to the state regulator).
102. See id. § 1357.03(f).
103. See id. §§ 1357.03(f), 1357.05 to 1357.06.
104. See id. § 1357.07.
105. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1208.1 (West 2013); TEX. INS.
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These market-conduct restrictions essentially impose an
equal treatment requirement on carriers, such that if they are
to enter a market at all, they must be willing to deal on equal
terms with all those who seek coverage. Thus, while rating
regulations assure that care is relatively affordable to those
who have health conditions, the market-conduct restrictions
ensure that carriers cannot avoid covering sicker individuals
through marketing tactics or eligibility requirements. In sum,
market-conduct rules form an important component of states’
efforts to ensure access to health plans.106
4. Regulation of Plan Coverage
The scope of health plans’ coverage is another area of
significant state regulatory attention. States generally define a
menu of health services that plans must cover, and they also
impose rules governing provider access and restricting the
means by which plans can act as gatekeepers to care.
Turning again to California’s small-group market
regulations, the state defines a set of “basic health services”
that must be included in all small-group plans. The scope of
these basic services is actually quite broad.107 An accompanying
regulation elaborates these basic requirements, specifying to a
fine degree of detail exactly what the plans must cover.108
CODE ANN. § 1501.156 (West 2013).
106. Here again, however, there is a tradeoff associated with these rules.
By requiring carriers to issue policies to all who seek coverage, marketconduct restrictions raise the cost of doing business in a market. At the
margin, these rules may make certain markets unprofitable, and some
carriers may decline to offer any coverage in these areas. Under these
circumstances, consumers will have fewer choices and may pay higher
premiums due to lack of competition. The ACA’s universal guaranteed-issue
provision is partly an attempt to solve this problem. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b-1
(2012).
107. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1345(b) (defining “basic health
services,” which includes physician services, hospital inpatient services,
ambulatory care, diagnostic services, home health services, preventative care,
emergency health services, and hospice care); id. § 1357.08 (stipulating smallgroup plan coverage requirements).
108. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, § 1300.67 (2013). Consider, for
example, the regulatory definition of inpatient hospital services:
Inpatient hospital services . . . shall mean short-term
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Beyond prescribing what the plans must cover, states also
specify how the plans must deliver that coverage. Two
significant aspects of carriers’ businesses are the subject of
regulatory attention in this vein—provider contracting and
utilization management.
States vary significantly in their approaches to regulating
provider contracting. Most states employ some restrictions on
the narrowness of a plan’s provider network—they require that
plans contract with some or all of the providers in the state. As
explained by Jill A. Marsteller and her colleagues: “There are
two broad categories of statutes that restrict selective
contracting. Any willing provider (AWP) laws require plans to
include in their networks all providers who agree to comply
with plan conditions. Freedom of choice (FOC) laws limit plans’
ability to channel patients to those selected providers.”109
Regardless of their choice of approach, state regulation in
this area seeks to ensure that patients have access to a
relatively wide set of providers, and to prevent carriers from
squeezing providers out of the market through unduly
restrictive contracting. These goals are somewhat in tension
with those of the carrier. Contracting with providers is one of
the primary means by which health plans control the cost of

general hospital services, including room with customary
furnishings and equipment, meals (including special diets
as medically necessary), general nursing care, use of
operating room and related facilities, intensive care unit
and services, drugs, medications, biologicals, anesthesia and
oxygen services, diagnostic laboratory and x-ray services,
special duty nursing as medically necessary, physical
therapy, respiratory therapy, administration of blood and
blood products, and other diagnostic, therapeutic and
rehabilitative services as appropriate, and coordinated
discharge planning including the planning of such
continuing care as may be necessary, both medically and as
a means of preventing possible early rehospitalization.
Id. § 1300.67(b); see also FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 61, at 360
(summarizing typical coverage mandates).
109. Jill A. Marsteller et al., The Resurgence of Selective Contracting
Restrictions, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1133, 1138-43, 1152-53 (1997)
(explaining differences between approaches, and surveying regulations in
place in each state).
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care.110 By offering to funnel their patients to a provider
through network rules, plans are able to negotiate discounted
rates for care.111 While these discounts come at the cost of
marginal patient choice, cheaper care is also in states’
interests, as lower costs indirectly facilitate access to care.112
Given this delicate balance, it is unsurprising that states have
pursued a wide range of approaches in this area.113
In addition to requiring carriers to contract with certain
providers, states impose restrictions on the terms of those
contracts. The most common of these restrictions prevents
health plans from devising incentive programs that induce
providers to restrict the care they provide to patients.114 Some
states, such as Illinois, have anti-retaliation provisions that
prevent carriers from terminating provider contracts based on
a provider’s role in advocating for a patient’s care.115 Another
common rule restricts how often and under what circumstances
plans can make changes to or terminate their provider
contracts.116
Utilization management programs and other care
determinations are also an important subject of state
regulatory attention. These programs are the means through
which plans ensure that consumers do not needlessly incur
health care expenses. The most familiar utilization
management mechanism is prior authorization, which requires
110. See id. at 1134.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1154-55 (discussing why states have pursued differing
approaches to provider contracting regulation).
114. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1348.6 (West 2013); cf. MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-112.2(b) (West 2013) (limiting carriers’ ability to
condition non-HMO provider contracts on providers’ willingness to join HMO
panels); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O, § 10 (West 2013); TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. § 1301.068 (West 2013).
115. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/35 (West 2013); see also MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-112(e), (g); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O, § 4; TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. § 1301.066.
116. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/368b; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1375.7; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a-478h, 38a-479b (West 2013)
(regulating the termination of provider contracts, changes to fee schedules,
use of most-favored nation provisions, and payment disputes between
carriers and providers); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-17.18-1 (West 2013); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. § 1301.057.
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plan members to obtain referrals or other permission before
seeking specialist care.117 Typical state regulation of utilization
management programs requires that carriers adhere to written
evaluation criteria that are developed with physician input.118
States also require that carriers have an internal appeal
process in place for members to contest care determinations, 119
and some require that members have recourse to independent
reviews.120 Lastly, some states also impose regulations that
restrict the grounds upon which carriers may deny coverage.
California, for example, does not allow carriers to deny
payment for coverage received on an emergency basis after
hours unless the plan maintains a hotline that a member can
use to obtain a coverage decision within thirty minutes.121
5. Producer Regulation
Insurance producers—that is, brokers and agents who sell
plans to individuals and employers—are another object of state
regulatory attention. States require that agents and brokers
obtain a license before engaging in insurance transactions.122
In California, obtaining a license requires, among other things,
that the agent pass an examination,123 participate in
continuing education programs,124 and pay a fee.125 Once

117. See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW, supra note 61, at 627-28.
118. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1363.5, 1367.01; CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-591c(2); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1756O, § 12(a); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. § 4201.151.
119. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.2; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38a-591e; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10a02; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O, §§ 12(e), 13; TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§§ 4201.351 to 4201.360.
120. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38a-591g; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A03; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176O § 14; TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 4201.401 to
4201.403.
121. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.36.
122. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1626 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38a-702b; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/500-15; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 10-103;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60K.37 (West 2013); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 4001.101.
123. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1676.
124. See id. § 1749.31.
125. See id. § 1750.
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licensed, agents are subject to restrictions regarding
commission sharing,126 and are subject to stringent fiduciary
standards.127 These regulations reflect the importance states
have attached to the insurance distribution process as a means
of consumer protection.
D. The Benefits of State Health Insurance Regulation
States are well suited to performing the regulatory
functions described above. In general, allowing regulatory
functions to remain at the state level promotes democratic
accountability, creativity, and sensitivity to local interests.
Beyond these general benefits that pertain to many industries,
there is reason to think that health insurance in particular is
an apt candidate for state regulation.
First, the regulation of health plans is inextricably
intertwined with the cost, quality, and availability of health
care. These connections are relatively easy to see: the rate that
consumers must pay to have health insurance affects their
ability to receive care. Similarly, the way insurance carriers
compensate providers (and especially how they structure their
contracts) affects providers’ incentives to provide cost-effective,
quality care. While these connections are not difficult to see,
the relationship between them is complex, and fraught with
tradeoffs. By relaxing provider network standards, for example,
states may make health insurance more affordable at the
margin (by allowing carriers to consolidate their networks and
negotiate more aggressively with providers), but these cost
savings may aggravate consumers, who may no longer be able
to see the doctor of their choice. To the extent that these
dilemmas have answers, they are difficult to discern in the
abstract. Accordingly, the health care system as a whole
benefits from states’ willingness to experiment with different
regulatory rules. Those that work can serve as a model for
other states, and those that do not can be scrapped in favor of a

126. See, e.g., id. § 1724 (prohibiting agents from sharing commissions
with members of the bar).
127. See, e.g., id. §§ 1734, 1734.5.
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superior scheme from a neighboring jurisdiction.128
Many of these tradeoffs, however, are not amenable to a
single solution. Rather, the choices states must make between
access, quality, and cost are simply value judgments. One
electorate may wish to have richer minimum health benefits,
either at the expense of greater cost or provider choice. Another
may prefer a more modest minimum set of benefits, with the
aim of allowing lower cost, high-deductible plans to be
available for those who might otherwise forego coverage.
Allowing states to make differing regulatory judgments
regarding these kinds of questions affords consumers a greater
opportunity to influence regulators’ approaches to these
tradeoffs.129 It is also much easier for consumers to organize
and influence a state insurance regulator than a national
one.130 This is especially true given the movement toward

128. This kind of regulatory cross-pollination is particularly likely to
take place in the insurance-regulation context, as the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, a voluntary association of state insurance
regulators, provides a mechanism for states to share ideas. See Randall,
supra note 15, at 636-37.
129. See Martin F. Grace & Hal S. Scott, An Optional Federal Charter
for Insurance: Rationale and Design, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18, at 55, 72-73 (arguing that
a national insurance regulator would be less responsive to consumers than a
local one).
130. The fact that many health plans are purchased by employers may
amplify consumers’ voices in this context. The employer provides a natural
organizing point for consumers, who can readily coordinate lobbying efforts
with similarly situated individuals. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285-87 (1988) (summarizing public choice
literature on interest groups, which suggests that ease of organization is an
important predictor of the success of an interest group). Relocation is
another—albeit more extreme—means of influencing regulation at the state,
but not the national, level. To the extent that the content of insurance
regulation is important to consumers or employers who sponsor health plans,
they are free to relocate to a state with rules they prefer. Of course, a state’s
health insurance regulatory policies are unlikely to dictate where an
individual will choose to live or an employer will choose to locate. But these
policies are likely to be correlated with other issues (such as overall levels of
taxation and business climate) that may affect such choices. Accordingly,
there is reason to think individuals and firms derive some benefit from state
diversity in this regard. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20 (1956).
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elected state insurance commissioners.131
A second reason to think state regulation of health
insurance is desirable relates specifically to rate regulation.
State regulators, particularly in those states with elected
insurance commissioners, have a desire to keep insurance rates
as low as possible for consumers. The danger of this kind of
rate regulation is that states may go too far, setting rates at a
level that makes it impossible for carriers to operate profitably.
If this happens in a system with a single regulator, carriers
have few options. However, if a single state applies this kind of
pressure to a carrier, the firm may exit that state’s market.132
Since consumers have an interest in preventing such exits
because they reduce the amount of choice in the market, the
ability of carriers to exit a state provides a check against what
might otherwise be an overwhelming popular demand for low
rates.
A third reason to favor state regulation of health insurance
is that many important aspects of health insurance markets
are local. Much of the profitability of health insurers turns on
the reimbursement agreements they make with providers. This
contracting dynamic in turn depends on the relative
concentration of providers in a market. For example, if one
hospital dominates a small town, a health carrier will have
little choice but to reach a reimbursement agreement with the
hospital—consumers in that town would not want to have a
health plan that didn’t cover care in the only hospital. In this
situation, the hospital would have a great deal of negotiating
leverage over the carrier. State governments are better
positioned to take stock of these dynamics when setting
131. See Macey & Miller, supra note 15, at 82-83 & n.282 (arguing that
structural reforms such as the movement toward election of insurance
commissioners and mandated consumer participation in rate setting may
give consumers too much sway over state regulators). One scholar has argued
that consumers “do not participate in insurance issues,” and therefore the
industry’s influence over regulators is greater than that of consumers. See
Randall, supra note 15, at 669-72. There is reason to think, however, that
regulator-industry dynamic is different in the health insurance context.
Health insurance issues are much more salient, and the fact that health
benefits are employer provided makes it easier for consumers to organize.
132. See Randall, supra note 15, at 675-76; Richard A. Epstein, Exit
Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 293, 300-04 (1999).
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insurance regulation rules. Rules related to provider networks
and provider-carrier contracting, in particular, may need to be
adjusted to reflect the relative positions of providers and
carriers in a given market.
The final reason to favor state health insurance regulation
is that states have developed considerable institutional
capabilities in the general area of insurance regulation. This
experience suggests both that states may be more effective
regulators (because of the benefits of this experience), and that
they may be able to regulate in certain areas more efficiently
than a federal regulator due to economies of scale (for example
the regulation of insurance agents, who work in both the
property-casualty and health markets).
***
In sum, states devote a significant amount of regulatory
energy to managing the conduct of health plans. The broad
outlines of these regulations are fairly consistent from state-tostate, which is unsurprising given states share a common goal
of providing access to health coverage at reasonable cost.
However, there is considerable diversity in the specific means
states have chosen to meet those shared ends. These
differences are consequential—they have a direct impact on the
relative cost of plans. And at bottom, they reflect political
economy judgments—some states are more willing than others
to accept higher cost of care in exchange for broader
coverage.133 Moreover, state-based regulation of health
insurance likely allows greater opportunity for consumers to
influence their regulators, leads to more efficient rate
regulation (by preserving exit options for carriers), encourages
sensitivity to local interests, and allows states to capture
synergies by consolidating regulation of health and other lines
of insurance under a single authority.
By assigning primary regulatory responsibility to the
133. See Robert Detlefsen, Dual Insurance Chartering: Potential
Consequences, in THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 18, at 97, 103-08 (characterizing property-casualty
insurance as a means of redistributing wealth to achieve social welfare goals,
and noting the concomitant political salience of insurance regulation).
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states, the current regulatory structure for health insurance
suggests a judgment that it is worth preserving states’ role in
health insurance regulation. Even before passage of the ACA,
however, states were not the exclusive regulators of health
plans. As the next section explains, certain judgments about
plan regulation have long been made at the federal level.
IV. Federal Regulation of Health Plans Before the ACA
Congress did not work from a blank slate when it enacted
the ACA. The federal government has played a role in the
regulation of health plans since the 1970s, beginning with the
enactment of the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973
(“HMO Act”).134 Therefore, to understand the ways in which the
ACA affects the state-federal balance of regulatory authority,
one must understand the pre-ACA federal regulatory regime.
This Part briefly explains the contours of three federal statutes
that bear on the regulations of health plans: the HMO Act, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)135
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accessibility Act of
1996 (“HIPAA”).136
A. The HMO Act
The HMO Act was the first significant federal statute to
directly regulate health insurance. Congress hoped the Act
would encourage the development of HMOs, which were seen
as an effective way to manage the cost of health care.137 As
originally conceived, the HMO Act was something of a quidpro-quo offer to HMOs: HMOs could elect to become federally
registered, which entitled them to various forms of federal

134. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e to
300e-14a (2012).
135. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
136. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
137. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY
1267 (2d ed. 1998).
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support (including access to a subsidized loan program), in
exchange for compliance with a set of federal regulations.138
Some of the rules in the HMO Act touched on traditional
areas of state regulation. The Act established a minimum set of
benefits that HMO plans are required to offer,139 set rules
regarding access to care, including both provider contracting
and utilization management,140 and also regulated HMO
solvency.141 However, these rules were far from comprehensive,
and appear to be geared primarily toward ensuring the
integrity of the HMO Act’s loan program. Consistent with this
observation, the HMO Act did not include a preemption
provision, and expressly contemplated that state regulations
would continue to apply to HMOs, at least insofar as they did
not prevent them from doing business in the state.142 Thus,
while the HMO Act is significant in that it represents the
federal government’s first steps into substantive health
insurance regulation, it did little to alter the balance of federal
and state regulatory authority. The same is not true of ERISA,
the next major federal statute affecting health plans.
B. ERISA
Prior to the passage of the ACA, ERISA was the most
important federal statute in terms of defining the boundaries of
state and federal regulatory authority over health plans. Given
this import, it is odd that Congress did not intend ERISA to be
a health care measure at all. Rather, ERISA was intended to
prevent fraud and mismanagement in the administration of
employee benefit schemes, particularly those intended to
provide retirement income.143 The statute’s definition of
138. See id. at 1267-68.
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(1); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.101 (1993).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(b)(3)-(4); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.103.
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e(c); see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.120.
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (exempting HMOs that “cannot do business
. . . in a State” from state regulations that “prevent it from operating as a
health maintenance organization”).
143. See HAVIGHURST ET AL., supra note 137, at 66; Jana K. Strain &
Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good Intentions: Problems and
Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 29, 30 (1999).
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“employee benefit plan,” however, was broad enough to
encompass certain types of employer-provided health coverage,
namely plans established by employers that affect interstate
commerce.144
The significance of the fact that some health plans fall
under ERISA relates to the Act’s sweeping preemption
provision. As currently enacted, the provision provides that
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”145
In other words, plans subject to ERISA are not subject to state
insurance regulation. This general provision is, however,
subject to an important qualification: “nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates insurance.”146
The Supreme Court has interpreted the insurance
regulation exemption to confine ERISA’s reach to self-insured
employer health plans—that is, those where the employer, and
not an insurance carrier, bears the financial risk of employees’
claims.147 Under this reading of the provision, third-party
administrators (often health insurance carriers) that assist
employers with the administration of self-funded plans are also
subject to ERISA. Thus, ERISA effectively exempts both

144. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012). This definition is subject to several
exceptions, including a limited one for health insurers. See id. § 1003(b).
145. Id. § 1144(a).
146. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). This provision preserving state insurance
regulation is in turn subject to a so-called “deemer” provision designed to
ensure that the insurance regulation exemption does not swallow the general
rule: “an employee benefit plan . . . shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance
company . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate
insurance companies.” Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
147. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 732 (1985)
(“Plans may self-insure or they may purchase insurance for their
participants. Plans that purchase insurance—so-called ‘insured plans’—are
directly affected by state laws that regulate the insurance industry.”). Many
employers who run self-funded plans purchase a form of reinsurance known
as stop-loss coverage designed to protect the employer should plan expenses
rise to catastrophic levels. See Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer:
ERISA Preemption Under the Deemer Clause as Applied to Employer Health
Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J. LEGIS. 307, 311-13 (1997)
(collecting cases). Courts have split over whether the stop-loss products,
which closely resemble traditional forms of risk insurance, fall within the
scope of ERISA’s preemption provision. See id.
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employers who provide self-funded plans, along with any
insurance company that the employer may hire to administer
the self-funded plan, from the ambit of state regulation.148
ERISA thus effectively carves the health insurance market
into two distinct spheres with different regulators: federally
regulated employer-funded health plans (primarily offered by
large employers), and state-regulated “risk” plans (offered to
smaller employers and individuals). As the language of
ERISA’s preemption provision suggests, state regulators are
virtually ousted from the self-funded market.
ERISA’s effect on the overall allocation of state and federal
regulatory authority is significant. As of 2012, approximately
89.4 million Americans were enrolled in an employer-funded
health plan.149 This figure represents roughly one-third of the
nonelderly (i.e., non-Medicare-eligible) population in the United
States.150 While this still leaves the lion’s share of the insurable
population—roughly 60 million people with risk-based group
plans, 15 million people with individual plans, and 48 million
uninsured individuals151—subject to state regulation, ERISA

148. In holding that an insurance carrier, Provident, was not subject to
state regulation in its capacity as a third-party administrator of a self-funded
health plan, the Ninth Circuit explained:
The primary features of an insurance contract are the
spreading and underwriting of a policyholder’s risk . . . .
There was no insurance contract or policy involved in [the
employee’s] claim. Provident’s role in relation to the [Plan]
and [the employee’s] claim was not that of an insurance
company but was merely as an administrative overseer.
Provident’s privilege to review the administrator’s
determination of the amount of a claim and to defend or
settle any action on a claim under the Plan does not require
a finding that Provident was engaged in the business of
insurance in relation to the Plan.
Moore v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922, 926-27 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citation omitted).
149. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. ET AL., supra note 75, at 50, 161
(reporting that 149 million Americans had employer-sponsored health
coverage, and that 60 percent of these individuals were enrolled in employerfunded plans).
150. See id. at 14.
151. See id. at 50; John Holahan & Megan McGrath, Reversing the
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nonetheless creates a significant role for the federal
government.
A curious aspect of ERISA’s relation to health plans is that
although it displaces state regulation, it imposes very little
federal regulation of health plans. The statute contains a
number of regulatory provisions, but they do not impose the
kind of substantive restrictions on the health insurance
business that are commonplace in state regulations.152 The
statute’s regulations reflect its orientation toward non-health
insurance forms of employee benefits, such as pension plans.
For example, the statute imposes restrictions on what
employers may do with benefit plan funds,153 and imposes
fiduciary requirements on plan administrators.154 Perhaps of
more utility to health plan members, the statute provides a
private cause of action that members can invoke to enforce the
processing of claims.155 While these provisions may have
indirect effects on the management of health plans, one could
not characterize them as substitutes for traditional state
regulations, such as those that restrict plan rating or
marketing.
ERISA does contain a handful of regulations specifically
targeted at health insurance, but they are modest in scope, and
were all added to the original statute by subsequent legislation.
For example, provisions in the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”)156 require employers to
allow employees to retain health coverage, at their own
expense, following termination of their employment or other
triggering events.157 Other pieces of federal legislation have
imposed mandates that employer-funded plans cover certain

Trend? Understanding the Recent Increase in Health Insurance Coverage
Among the Nonelderly Population, KAISER COMM’N MEDICAID & UNINSURED 14
(Mar. 2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/826402.pdf.
152. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 to 1112 (2012).
153. See id. § 1106.
154. See id. § 1104.
155. See id. § 1132(a).
156. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986).
157. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161 to 1168 (requiring employer-funded health
plans to offer coverage, at cost, to employees who satisfy certain criteria).
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types of care. These coverage requirements, however, are
extremely limited—they apply only to certain maternity and
newborn-care
services,
mental-health
coverage,
and
mastectomies.158 Significantly, there is no provision requiring
that a plan cover a basic package of essential benefits. Lastly,
as will be discussed further in the next section, HIPAA imposes
several modest reforms related to portability and coverage of
preexisting conditions.
Taken together, ERISA’s provisions result in what some
commentators have termed a “regulatory vacuum.”159 The
statute displaces state regulation of employer-funded health
plans, but does not impose comparable regulations of its own,
leaving the self-funded employer market virtually free of the
kind of regulation states typically impose in health insurance
markets. The major post-ERISA federal forays into health
insurance regulation—HIPAA and the ACA—have not altered
this pattern, as they are primarily focused on the individual
and small-employer markets.
C. HIPAA
The 1996 HIPAA statute, primarily known for the privacy
standards it imposes on health providers, also contained
several modest insurance market reforms.160 These reforms,
which apply to both the group “risk” markets and the
individual market, were in some ways precursors to the rules
in the ACA—indeed the ACA superseded many of them. The
HIPAA rules cover some of the same subjects as the ACA, such
as guaranteed issue requirements and preexisting condition
exclusions, but their requirements are considerably less
stringent.

158. See id. § 1185 (maternity and newborn care requirements); id.
§ 1185a (mental health benefits); id. § 1185b (benefits for reconstructive
surgery following mastectomies); see also Strain & Kinney, supra note 143, at
43 (recounting the legislative history behind these provisions).
159. See Strain & Kinney, supra note 143, at 50. For a summary of
criticisms that have been levied against ERISA on this score, see id. at 40; see
also Morrissey, supra note 147, at 307.
160. See generally HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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In the group market, HIPAA limits, but does not eliminate,
carriers’
ability
to
impose
preexisting
condition
requirements.161 Specifically, the Act imposes a number of
timing rules that limit the circumstances in which carriers may
decline to cover a preexisting condition. For example, the
prospective member must have received care for the condition
within six months before applying for coverage.162 HIPAA also
caps the length of time that the preexisting condition exclusion
may apply.163 And it prevents carriers from using patients’
genetic information as a means of defining exclusions.164 In a
similar vein, the statute prevents carriers from using health
status as an eligibility rule for coverage, or from charging
higher premiums based on health risk.165 These reforms are
part of a broader set of rules intended to facilitate patient
movement between health plans.166
HIPAA contains a similar set of provisions affecting the
individual market. Carriers were prohibited from declining to
extend coverage in the individual market to prospective
members who previously had qualifying coverage.167 HIPAA
also obliged individual market plans to renew coverage for all
members that requested renewal, absent certain specified
circumstances such as nonpayment of premiums, fraud, or
termination of the plan.168
These HIPAA market regulations bear a family
resemblance to those contained in the ACA. But they are much
more modest in scope. For example, the guaranteed issue
provisions in both the group and individual markets are subject
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2012).
162. See id. 1181(a)(1).
163. See id. § 1181.
164. See id. § 1181(b).
165. See id. § 1182.
166. See, e.g., id. § 1181 (requiring that plans allow certain individuals
who lost other coverage to enroll at any time regardless of enrollment
schedule, and imposing similar rules for dependent coverage).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41 (2012). This individual market
guaranteed-issue provision was subject to an exception available to carriers
able to show that accepting additional individual market members would
impose an unacceptable stain on their financial reserves. See id. § 300gg41(e) (referring to the first subsection (e), “Application of financial capacity
limits”).
168. See id. § 300gg-42.
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to a number of exceptions, and neither applies uniformly to all
prospective members. Perhaps more importantly, HIPAA’s
individual market rules were, in a sense, optional. Section 2744
of the Act contained a state waiver provision that exempted
plans in states that had implemented an “acceptable
alternative mechanism” from HIPAA’s individual guaranteed
issue requirement.169 Among such permissible mechanisms
were public solutions, including state-run high-risk pools.170
Thus, states wishing to avoid the imposition of HIPAA rules on
their private individual market carriers could satisfy the
statute’s requirements by other means. The group market
reforms did not contain a waiver provision, but nonetheless
preserved ample room for continued operation of state laws
that did not prevent the application of the HIPAA rules.171
Therefore, the group market reforms did little to affect the
federal-state regulatory balance beyond establishing a limited
guaranteed issue requirement.
In sum, while Congress enacted several pieces of
legislation that regulated private health insurance markets
before the ACA, these statutes—with the exception of ERISA’s
(unintended) effects in the self-funded market—largely
preserved the states’ role as the primary regulator of
insurance. The ACA, however, fundamentally altered that
balance.
V. The ACA’s Health Insurance Market Reforms
A significant portion of the ACA’s 906 pages is devoted to
health insurance market reforms. To understand how these
reforms alter the balance of federal and state regulatory
authority, it is necessary to understand both the substantive
content of the Act’s rules and the institutions charged with
enforcing them. To that end, this Part first explains the role of
169. See id. § 300gg-44(a).
170. See id. § 300gg-44(b).
171. See 29 U.S.C. § 1191(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]his part shall not be
construed to supersede any provision of State law which establishes . . . any
standard or requirement solely relating to health insurance issuers . . . except
to the extent that such standard or requirement prevents the application of a
requirement of this part.”).
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health insurance exchanges in the ACA’s regulatory
architecture. It then discusses the reforms that apply to all
health plans, regardless of how they are sold, before turning to
the regulations that specifically affect plans sold through the
exchanges. It concludes with a brief discussion of the Act’s
provisions regarding multistate plans.
A. The Role of Health Exchanges in the ACA’s Regulatory
Regime
One of the signature provisions of the ACA is its creation
of state-run health plan marketplaces, formally termed
“American Health Benefit Exchanges.”172 The exchanges are
intended to be the primary means by which individuals and
small groups purchase coverage under the ACA. The theory
behind the exchanges is straightforward. They seek to simplify
health plan purchasing decisions by marrying a streamlined
presentation of plan choices with a centralized listing of
qualified plans available in the state.173 In addition to these
consumer-facing attributes, Congress hoped that the exchanges
would improve the functioning of the individual and smallgroup markets by increasing transparency and facilitating
consumer choice.174 The exchanges play a significant role in the
regulation of insurance markets because, as discussed in
greater detail below, the ACA empowers exchanges to impose
or enforce a number of rules regulating the conduct of plans
participating in the exchange.
Rather than establishing a single federal exchange, the
drafters of the ACA opted to require the states to establish

172. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2012). The Act includes separate
provisions for small employers, which are to purchase coverage through the
“Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP).” These provisions track
those for the individual-market exchanges in relevant respects. See id.
173. See Health Plan Information for Individuals and Families,
HEALTHCARE.GOV., https://www.healthcare.gov/health-plan-information/ (last
visited Feb. 8, 2014).
174. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY POLICY ISSUES 2 (2010), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/FundReports/2010/Jul/Health-Insurance-Exchanges-and-the-Affordable-CareAct.aspx.
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exchanges.175 States’ exchange plans are subject to review by
the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”).176 As
of March 7, 2013, HHS has approved twenty-five states’
exchange plans.177 Securing approval of an exchange required
submission of an exchange “blueprint” to HHS by January 1,
2013.178 HHS evaluated these submissions to determine
whether the exchange would be able to carry out its required
functions and to assess whether it would be able to do so by the
applicable deadlines.179 Importantly, if a state elected not to
create its own exchange, or if it failed to submit its blueprint by
the January 2013 deadline, the regulations stipulate that
“HHS must (directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit
entity) establish and operate such Exchange within the
State.”180
Although the ACA envisions that the exchanges will be the
primary means by which consumers and small businesses
purchase health coverage, the Act does permit the continued
operation of other distribution channels.181 This provision

175. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.10, 155.110 (2012).
The exchanges must be organized as a state agency or as a not-for-profit
corporation. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.110(c). If the exchange is to be run by a
nonprofit corporation, that organization must have “demonstrated experience
on a State or regional basis in the individual and small-group health
insurance markets and in benefits coverage,” and cannot be a health
insurance issuer. Id. § 155.110(a). An insurance agent, for example, would
have “demonstrated experience” in health insurance markets, but is not a
health insurer.
176. See id. § 155.105.
177. See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Oversight, State Health Insurance
Marketplaces,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
http://www.cciio.cms.gov/resources/factsheets/state-marketplaces.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2014). HHS has approved single-state exchanges in the
following states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and
Washington. See id. HHS has approved partnership exchanges in an
additional seven states: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New
Hampshire, and West Virginia. See id. These regional exchanges are
authorized under a separate set of rules, but otherwise function similarly to a
single-state exchange. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.140.
178. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.105(a).
179. See id. § 155.105(b).
180. See id. § 155.105(f).
181. See 42 U.S.C. §18032 (2012).
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allows insurance agents and brokers to continue to find
coverage for individuals and businesses and leaves the
regulation of these individuals to state authorities.182
Moreover, these intermediaries are permitted to enroll
individuals and businesses in plans offered on exchanges.183
They also are able to continue to market plans that are not
deemed qualified to be offered on the exchange.184 Thus, the
ACA envisions two markets for health plans operating in
parallel: the market for “qualified” plans, which may be sold
through the exchange and other distribution channels, and the
market for other plans, which may only be sold outside the
exchange. However, even these “nonqualified” plans are subject
to extensive regulation under the ACA.
B. The ACA’s Universal Insurance Market Regulations
As part of its general reform of health insurance markets,
the ACA imposes a number of regulations that apply to all
health plans, regardless of whether they are sold through the
ACA exchanges. These provisions effectively federalize a
portion of health plan regulation. Although the provisions do
leave room for states to impose additional rules, particularly if
the state rules are more stringent than those in the Act, they
nonetheless significantly restrict states’ freedom to regulate
rating, underwriting, and market conduct.
The most significant of the ACA’s universal regulations
pertain to rating and underwriting. First, the Act sharply
restricts how carriers may rate their plans. Specifically, the Act
allows only four rating factors: family composition, age,
geography, and tobacco use.185 Even within these factors, the
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. § 18032(d)(3)(B).
185. See id. § 300gg(a)(1)(B). The ACA also regulates how carriers may
use these factors. For example, it stipulates that the variation in pricing for
individuals of different ages may not exceed a ratio of three to one, and that
HHS has authority to define the age bands carriers may use. See id. §§
300gg(a)(1)(A)(iii), 300gg(a)(3). Similarly, the Act mandates that rates may
not vary by more than 1.5 to 1 for tobacco use. Id. § 300gg(a)(1)(A)(iv). With
respect to rating by geography, the Act requires states to define geographic
regions for rating purposes, and grants the HHS Secretary the right to review
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Act limits what carriers may do. Beyond limiting carriers to
certain rating factors, the ACA also specifies that they must
group all individual and small-group applicants in the same
risk pool—that is, there must be a single set of rating factor
adjustments for the entirety of the individual and small-group
markets.186 Lastly, the Act limits the extent to which employers
may share costs with their employees.187 Specifically, the Act
caps deductibles and other employee contributions at specified
dollar amounts.188
The ACA also confers temporary authority on the HHS
Secretary to review and approve any rate changes before they
take effect.189 Should the Secretary determine that a given rate
increase is “unreasonable,” the Secretary “shall require health
insurance issuers to submit to the Secretary and the relevant
State a justification for an unreasonable premium increase
prior to the implementation of the increase.”190 Moreover, the
Act requires carriers to post rate-change information to their
public websites.191 HHS will initially conduct this annual
review process, but it will later be transferred to the states for
ongoing administration.192 Even after this transition, however,
HHS retains continuing responsibility to monitor rate
changes.193
One of the most high-profile market reforms in the ACA is
those areas and impose a substitute set of areas if the state’s efforts are
deemed inadequate. See id. § 300gg(a)(2).
186. See id. § 18032(c).
187. See id. § 300gg-6(b).
188. See id. § 18022(c). These cost sharing limits do not apply to plans
offered in the individual market. See id.
189. See id. § 300gg-94(a).
190. Id. § 300gg-94(a)(2).
191. See id. § 300gg-94(a)(2). This provision is one of a number of
reporting requirements that apply to all health plans. See also id. § 300gg15a (requiring that carriers operating outside the exchange provide the
public with the information listed in 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(3)); id. § 300gg-15
(requiring carriers to provide benefit summaries, in a form specified by the
HHS Secretary, to all members); id. § 300gg-17(a)(2) (requiring carriers to
submit care quality reports to HHS); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically
Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1368-69, 1379-80 (2011)
(championing the ACA’s various disclosure requirements as examples of best
practices).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-94.
193. See id. § 300gg-94(b)(2).
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its “guaranteed issue” requirement, which obligates “each
health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage
in the individual or group market in a State [to] accept every
employer and individual in the State that applies for such
coverage.”194 The guaranteed issue requirement fits closely
with four other provisions: a guaranteed renewability
requirement,195 a bar on preexisting condition exclusions,196 a
bar on the use of lifetime benefit caps,197 and a (duplicative) bar
on health-based eligibility rules.198 Taken together, these rules
force carriers to accept groups and individuals that would
otherwise have difficulty finding coverage due the poor health
status of their members.199
The ACA also sets a floor of minimum coverage that every
health plan must provide. Specifically, it demands that plans
sold in the individual or small-group markets offer an
“essential health benefits package.”200 The Act defines the
essential health benefits package to include coverage for
services within ten general categories,201 but does not mandate
the specific services that must be offered. Rather, the Act
requires that the HHS Secretary promulgate specific
requirements by rule, with reference “to the scope of benefits
provided [by] a typical employer plan.”202 In addition to the
essential health benefits requirements, the Act includes a
number of other coverage rules related to specific types of

194. Id. § 300gg-1(a).
195. See id. § 300gg-2(a) (“[I]f a health insurance issuer offers health
insurance coverage in the individual or group market, the issuer must renew
or continue in force such coverage at the option of the plan sponsor or the
individual, as applicable.”).
196. See id. § 300gg-3.
197. See id. § 300gg-11.
198. See id. § 300gg-4.
199. Another widely reported coverage requirement imposed by the Act
is a rule that employer-sponsored plans must extend coverage to employees’
dependents until they reach twenty-six years of age. See id. § 300gg-14.
200. See id. §§ 300gg-6, 18022.
201. The ten categories are: ambulatory patient services, emergency
services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and
substance abuse services, prescription drugs, rehabilitation services,
laboratory diagnostics, preventative care and disease management, and
pediatric services. See id. § 18022(b)(1).
202. Id. § 18022(b)(2)(A).
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care.203 To ensure that carriers do not circumvent these
coverage requirements with unduly restrictive approval
requirements, the Act mandates that carriers provide recourse
to both internal and external appeals processes.204
Collectively, these rules will impose a significant cost
burden on carriers, as they will be required to accept members
regardless of health status, must offer them a minimum set of
benefits, and are sharply restricted in their ability to charge
premiums commensurate to these risks. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the Act also includes a number of provisions
intended to address the financial strain that these rules impose
on carriers.205
The Act sets up two transitional programs that apply from
2014 until 2016. First, the Act mandates that all self-funded
employer plans—that is, those plans offered by large
employers—pay a levy that is used to fund a reinsurance plan
for the individual and small-group markets.206 The idea behind
this reinsurance plan is that it will help stabilize premiums in
the individual and small-group markets by providing support
for carriers that experience catastrophic losses as a result of
taking on high-risk members. Thus, the reinsurance provision
is essentially a tax on employees of large companies that is
used to fund the ACA’s care expansion. The second transitional
program establishes so-called “risk corridors,” which
redistribute profits and losses between carriers in the
individual and small-group markets.207 Any carrier that runs a

203. See, e.g., id. § 300gg-19a(b) (barring the use of prior authorization
requirements for emergency stabilization services, and mandating that
carriers not impose higher costs on consumers for using out-of-network
emergency services; id. § 300gg-19a(d) (prohibiting the use of prior
authorization for certain gynecological services); id. § 300gg-13 (imposing
specific preventative services coverage requirements).
204. See id. § 300gg-19 (requiring that carriers establish an internal
review process, and either comply with a state external review process or
develop one of their own if no state-run process exists).
205. It warrants mention that the Act also contains a temporary rule, in
effect until the end of 2013, which is intended to deal with the opposite
problem—that is, to penalize carriers whose plans are too profitable. See also
id. § 300gg-18 (requiring carriers to issue consumer rebates for plans that
have loss ratios below a certain threshold).
206. See id. § 18061.
207. See id. § 18062.
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plan with a loss ratio below 97 percent must pay a percentage
of its profits into the risk-corridor program.208 These profits will
be used to compensate those carriers who suffer loss ratios
above 103 percent.209
Beyond these temporary measures, the ACA requires
states to institute risk-adjustment programs, where states
transfer funds between plans based on their actuarial risks.210
States must measure the state average actuarial risk for a
given type of plan, and levy a fee against those plans with
below-average risks, and compensate those with above-average
risks.211
To summarize, the ACA sets a number of bounds on all
health plans’ ability to define plan benefits and set premiums.
In aggregate, these provisions have the effect of forcing health
plans to take on the risk associated with insuring all who seek
coverage. While these regulations substantially duplicate or
replace a significant portion of states’ traditional regulatory
prerogatives, they leave a number of areas of state regulation
undisturbed. The ACA’s universal regulations, for instance, do
not place limits on plan’s marketing techniques, provider
contracting, or care management practices. Plans sold through
the ACA’s exchanges, however, are subject to more extensive
regulation, which the drafters envisioned would be
administered by the exchanges themselves.
C. Regulation of Health Plans Sold Through ACA Exchanges
Beyond providing a convenient means for consumers to

208. Id. § 18062(b)(2). Plans must pay 1.5 percent of their gross
premium, less administrative expenses (the “target amount”), into the risk
corridor program if their loss ratios are between 92 and 97 percent. If their
loss ratios are below 92 percent, the plan must pay 2.5 percent of its target
amount into the program, as well as 80 percent of profits above a defined
amount. See id.
209. See id. § 18062(b)(1). If a plan’s loss ratio is between 103 and
108 percent, the plan will receive a 50 percent reimbursement for losses
above 103 percent. That is, if a plan experiences a loss ratio of 105, the
program will pay the plan 1 percent of the target amount. Higher payouts are
available for plans with loss ratios exceeding 108 percent. See id.
210. See id. § 18063.
211. See id. § 18063(a).
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shop for health plans, the ACA exchanges also play a
significant role in the regulation of health plans. The ACA
delegates a substantial amount of regulatory authority to the
exchanges, principally by giving exchanges the power to
determine which plans may be sold on the exchange. As part of
this power, exchanges have the responsibility to scrutinize each
plan’s benefits, premium, and network—all of which have
traditionally been regulated by the states. This section will
describe the role the exchanges play in the ACA’s regulatory
scheme. Part VI will explore the consequences this role has on
states’ regulatory authority.
1. Certification and Rate Review
Many of the exchanges’ regulatory functions relate to the
ACA’s requirement that only “qualified health plans” (“QHPs”)
may be sold on the exchanges.212 To be certified as a QHP, a
plan must: meet the minimum statutory certification criteria;
provide the ACA’s essential health benefits package; and be
offered by a state-licensed health insurer that agrees to
additional requirements.213 The exchanges are responsible for
certifying that plans meet these requirements.214 In addition to
verifying that the plans adhere to the statutory criteria, the
ACA grants the exchanges broad discretion to approve or deny
a certification application: “An Exchange may certify a health
plan as a qualified health plan if [the plan meets the statutory
requirements] and . . . the Exchange determines that making
available such health plan through such Exchange is in the
interests of qualified individuals and qualified employers in the
State.”215
The ACA’s statutory criteria for QHPs are phrased in

212. See id. § 18031(d)(2)(B)(i) (“An Exchange may not make available
any health plan that is not a qualified health plan.”).
213. See id. § 18021(a)(1); see also id. § 18031(e) (providing that the
exchanges are responsible for making QHP certifications).
214. The exchanges also have authority to set the procedures that
govern their certification processes. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.1010 (2012).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(e). Exchanges also have authority to decertify
plans as QHPs if they determine that the plan no longer meets the
certification criteria. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.1080.
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broad terms, and include a number of requirements of varying
significance. QHPs must “meet marketing requirements,” not
discourage enrollment by unhealthy individuals, “ensure
sufficient choice of providers,” meet various performance
criteria, employ a standard enrollment form, and report
various quality metrics.216
The statute explicitly contemplates that the criteria will be
fleshed out through rulemaking, but the regulations provide
little additional specificity. Significantly, however, they
condition fulfillment of the statutory criteria on satisfaction of
standards set by the exchanges. For example, the rule states
that plans are not eligible to be certified if they do not comply
with “any provisions imposed by the Exchange . . . that are
conditions of participation . . . with respect to each of its
QHPs,” or if the plan fails to adhere to the exchange’s
certification process.217 Similarly, the rules condition
certification on compliance with the Exchange’s network
adequacy
standards,218
termination
of
coverage
219
requirements,
and
the
carrier-level
accreditation
standards.220 In sum, even with respect to the statutory
certification criteria, exchanges have significant responsibility
to both define the standards that plans must meet and to
evaluate their performance against those standards.
The exchanges are also responsible for reviewing QHPs’
proposed rate increases.221 Upon receipt of a proposed rate
increase, the exchange must decide whether to approve the
increase.222 Neither the statute nor the proposed rules provide
detailed guidance as to how the exchange should make this
determination.223 The absence of more specific guidance
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c).
217. 45 C.F.R. § 156.200(d).
218. See id. § 156.230.
219. See id. § 156.270.
220. See id. § 156.275. This accreditation process is based on the “local
performance” of a plan’s QHPs in a number of areas, including clinical
quality measures, patient experience, and utilization management
performance. See id.
221. See id. § 156.210 (requiring that QHPs submit proposed rate
increases to the exchange).
222. See id. § 155.1020.
223. The statute provides only:
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strongly suggests that the exchanges will have significant
discretion to determine whether rate increases are sufficiently
“justified” to allow a plan to remain on offer.
If consumers participate in the exchanges in significant
numbers, exchanges’ certification and rate review powers will
give them de facto control over the individual and small-group
markets. In essence, the exchanges have the ability, subject
only to relatively narrow limits, to control entry into these
markets. Viewed this way, the exchanges’ regulatory
responsibilities closely resemble the states’ traditional
licensing function.224
2. Distribution
Consistent with their intended function as health plan
marketplaces, exchanges also have a significant amount of
control over the way individuals purchase health coverage.
Here again, the statute itself offers only sparse guidance as to
how the exchange marketplaces will function. The few specific
statutory requirements are mainly technical. The statute
requires that the exchanges use a “uniform enrollment form,”
developed by HHS, which may be submitted electronically or in

The Exchange shall require health plans seeking
certification as qualified health plans to submit a
justification for any premium increase prior to
implementation of the increase . . . . The Exchange shall
take this information, and the information and the
recommendations provided to the Exchange by the State . . .
into consideration when determining whether to make such
health plan available through the Exchange. The Exchange
shall take into account any excess of premium growth
outside the Exchange as compared to the rate of such
growth inside the Exchange, including information reported
by the States.
42 U.S.C. § 18031(e)(2) (2012). The proposed regulation substantially
duplicates this guidance. See QHP Issuer Rate and Benefit Information, 76
Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41921 (proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 155.1020).
224. See supra Part II.
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hard copy.225 Similarly, it mandates that exchanges use a
standard format for the presentation of benefits,226 and that
they assign a rating to each QHP offered through the
exchange.227 In terms of how exchanges are to conduct
transactions, the statute requires only that they maintain a
hotline and a website.228
HHS’ proposed regulations provide additional detail as to
how the exchanges must operate. For example, the rules list
the minimum amount of information that exchange websites
must provide about each QHP, require that the website include
a calculator to “facilitate the comparison of available QHPs,”
and mandate that the website have a “consumer assistance
function.”229 Similarly, the rules require that the exchanges
include certain information on all correspondence, facilitate
payment for coverage directly to the carrier, and meet various
privacy standards.230 The rules also dictate the periods during
the year when exchanges must allow consumers to switch
between plans.231
Nonetheless, within these relatively broad limits,
exchanges enjoy considerable freedom to define the terms of
consumers’ and plans’ interactions with the exchange. The
exchanges are presumably free, for example, to staff their call
centers as they see fit and to design the operation and
appearance of their websites as they wish. Similarly, the
exchanges are afforded broad discretion to set up “Navigator”
programs, which are designed to create a group of
intermediaries that will assist consumers in purchasing plans

225. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1)(F).
226. See id. § 18031(c)(1)(G).
227. See id. § 18031(c)(1)(H). The statute requires that plans be rated
bronze, silver, gold, or platinum based on their actuarial value. See id.
§ 18022(d).
228. See id. § 18031(d)(4).
229. See 45 C.F.R. § 155.205 (2013).
230. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41916
(proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.230 to 155.260).
231. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41917
(proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.410).
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through the exchange.232 Navigators are charged with
educating the public about the exchange, distributing
information on health plans, and assisting consumers with
enrollment.233 Importantly, the exchanges have discretion to
decide which organizations receive federal grants to become
navigators.234 While these may seem like relatively mundane
responsibilities, they will nonetheless define most of the
consumer-facing aspects of the exchanges, and will likely have
a significant impact on their ultimate success or failure.
D. Multistate Licensing Provisions
The statute also contains two provisions—both closely
linked with the exchange-based plan-licensing scheme—that
are designed to facilitate the creation of nationwide health
plans. Both provisions displace portions of state regulatory
authority in order to achieve this end.
The first program, which provides for the creation of
“Health Care Choice Compacts” (“HCCCs”) between states, is
effectively optional.235 States can choose whether to enter into
these compacts, which allow one state’s QHPs to be offered in
all states that signed the compact.236 In addition to complying
with the rules necessary to maintain their status as QHPs,237
the carriers selling plans under the compact need to be licensed
in each state where they offer a plan.238 Moreover, the plan
“would continue to be subject to market conduct, unfair trade
practices, network adequacy, and consumer protection
standards (including standards relating to rating) . . . of the

232. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i) (establishing Navigator program); Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41915-16 (proposed July 15,
2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.210).
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i)(3).
234. See Navigator Program Standards, 76 Fed. Reg. 41866-01, 41915-16
(proposed July 15, 2011) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 155.210).
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 18053(a).
236. See id. § 18053(a)(1). The statute also requires that states wishing
to take advantage of these compacts enact an enabling statute.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 212-20 (describing the QHP
criteria); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18053(a)(2).
238. See id. § 18053(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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State in which the purchaser resides.”239 Lastly, the compacts
are subject to approval by HHS, which is charged with
ensuring that the coverage and cost-sharing terms of the
compact are “at least as” stringent as those in the ACA.240 The
net effect of these requirements is that the HCCCs provide a
means by which the states can effectively delegate their ability
to license plans as QHPs to other member states. In other
words, the compacts provide a means for states to coordinate
with respect to the exchange-related ACA regulations while
leaving other state-based regulatory functions intact.
In contrast to the opt-in structure of the HCCCs, the ACA’s
second multistate plan provision is mandatory. The statute’s
“multi-State QHP” provision allows carriers to offer plans
which may be sold in all states in which the carrier is
licensed.241 In addition to meeting the single-state QHP
requirements, these multi-State QHPs must offer a uniform
benefits package in all states, must comply with each state
exchange’s QHP requirements, and must adhere to all state
laws that do not conflict with the multi-State QHP
provisions.242 Although the multi-State QHP program does not
entirely displace state law, it circumscribes its effect. The
Office of Personnel Management, which is charged with
administering the multi-State QHPs, has authority to
determine whether state laws conflict with the requirements of
the multi-State QHP program.243 Further, plans that meet the
multi-State QHP requirement need not obtain QHP
certification by every state exchange.244 In sum, the multi-State
QHP plan provision enacts a form of national plan licensing
239. Id. § 18053(a)(1)(B)(i).
240. See id. § 18053(a)(3).
241. See id. § 18054.
242. See id. § 18054(b). The regulations associated with the multi-State
QHP provision impose additional regulation covering benefits, levels of
coverage, and network adequacy, among other topics. See 45 C.F.R.
§§ 800.105 to 800.112.
243. See 45 C.F.R. § 800.114(b); see also Timothy Jost, Implementing
Health Reform: The Multi-State Plan Program Final Rule, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/03/02/implementing-health-reformthe-multi-state-plan-program-final-rule/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014)
(characterizing state-law compliance as “the most sensitive issue” addressed
by the multi-State QHP rulemaking process).
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 18054(d).
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that displaces both traditional and exchange-based state
regulation as a means of encouraging the development of
national health plans.
***
A comparison of the health plan regulations in the ACA
and the regulations traditionally imposed by states245 reveals a
great degree of overlap. To date, however, the relationship
between the exchanges and the allocation of regulatory
authority over plans has escaped scholarly attention. The next
Part of this paper turns to that relationship.
VI. State Health Insurance Regulation after the ACA
By any measure, the ACA heralds a significant shift of
health insurance regulatory responsibility from the states to
the federal government. As the discussion in Part VI makes
clear, the Act touches upon nearly every aspect of the business
of health insurance. Even in those areas that were already
subject to federal regulation,246 the ACA provisions represent a
step change in terms of stringency.
The changes wrought by the Act beg an obvious question—
in a post-ACA world, which entities are responsible for which
regulatory functions? This Part attempts to untangle this
question. After setting out the general contours of the postACA regulatory scheme, the balance of this Article turns to its
implications. First, it discusses the similarities between the
ACA and failed attempts to establish a regime of national
insurance chartering, and how the ACA is in many ways a
model for such a scheme. The Article concludes by arguing that
it is a flawed model. By displacing large swaths of state
insurance regulation through the unintended operation of the
exchange provisions, the statute will sacrifice many benefits of
state-based regulation. The fact that the statute works such
significant changes virtually by accident should give
proponents of greater regulatory centralization pause before
245. See supra Part III.
246. See supra Part IV.C.
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they celebrate the ACA as a model regulatory regime.
A. Where Does Regulatory Authority Reside after the ACA?
The ACA’s delegation of authority to administer its
regulatory requirements is complex. Table 1 provides a broad
overview of where regulatory authority rests under the statute.
HHS will assume direct authority over some aspects of health
insurance regulation (column 1). In other areas the statute has
left matters entirely to the states (column 2). Most important
for purposes of this Article, however, are the functions assigned
to the exchanges (column 3). States that create their own
exchange will retain control of these functions. But in the
twenty-six states that elected not to create exchanges, the
federal government will assume control of the regulatory
activities in column 3.
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Table 1: Allocation of Regulatory Authority under the ACA
Regulatory Function

Regulator
(1) States

Solvency regulation
Carrier reserves
Risk redistribution
Rating & underwriting
Definition of rating factors
Rate review
Market conduct
Guaranteed issue rules
Cost-sharing practices
Plan content regulation
Benefits content
Provider contracting
Network standards
Utilization management
Distribution
QHP certification
Agent/broker regulation
Consumer experience
Plan marketing
practices

√
√

(2) HHS

(3)
Exchanges
(State or
Federal)247

Temporary
measures248
√
√
√
√

Limited
authority249
√

√

√
√
√
√
√
√

247. As discussed above, these functions default to a federally run
exchange in the event that a state fails to establish its own exchange. See
supra text accompanying note 180. As of this writing, twenty-six states have
failed to establish an exchange, leaving the federal government to establish
an exchange covering half the country. See supra note 177.
248. See supra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B) (2012) (allowing states to
supplement plan content requirements provided they assume the associated
cost for certain individuals).
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Several things stand out about this new allocation of
regulatory authority. First, the areas of authority that remain
the sole province of the states are those that are relatively
technical in nature. Solvency regulation—which consists
primarily of imposing reserve requirements on carriers—is the
area that remains most firmly under state control.250 In one
sense, this is unsurprising. As described in Part II, solvency
regulation is a core competency of state insurance regulators.
Solvency regulation is largely the same across different lines of
insurance, and was the first aspect of the insurance industry to
be subject to regulation. The federal government, by contrast,
has relatively little experience regulating the solvency of
insurance carriers, which differs in important respects from
solvency regulation of other financial services industries.251
Provider contracting is another aspect of the health
insurance business that remains primarily within the states’
regulatory jurisdiction. As is the case with solvency, one could
imagine why Congress might have left provider-contracting
regulation to the states; provider contracting resembles
garden-variety commercial law relationships, which are defined
by state law. However, the reality is a bit more complicated.
One of the stated goals of the ACA was controlling the costs of
health care, and the contractual relationships between
insurance carriers and providers are a core driver of those
costs. Indeed, many have convincingly argued that reforming
these payment relationships is the best way to deal with the
problem of rising health care costs.252 Utilization management,
which is also left primarily to state regulation, is another
250. The ACA’s measures for allocating the risks associated with
guaranteed issue between carriers could also be classified as solvency
regulations. Insofar as these rules are creations of the ACA, however, they do
not disturb states’ traditional role. See supra notes 210-211 and
accompanying text.
251. Cf. John Patrick Hunt, Rating Dependent Regulation of Insurance,
17 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 104-05, 110-27 (2010) (explaining that the
justifications for solvency regulation in insurance are different from the
“systemic contagion” risks that animate banking solvency regulation, and
highlighting challenges posed by the 2008 financial crisis).
252. See, e.g., Steven A. Schroeder & William Frist, Phasing Out Fee-forService Payment, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029-30, 2032 (2013)
(“Controlling rising expenditures for health care will not occur without
changing the way that physicians are paid.”).
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critical means of controlling costs. Much like provider
contracting, there does not seem to be a clear technocratic or
political economy justification for leaving regulation of this
function to the states.
Viewed this way, assigning regulatory authority over these
areas to the states seems like an odd choice. If cost control is
indeed a key objective of the ACA, it is not clear why Congress
would allow the states to continue to control contracting. One
possible explanation is that the ACA does not heavily regulate
in these areas because the statute, as actually passed, does not
attempt to deal as comprehensively with the problem of health
care cost as originally imagined. Accounts of the debates over
drafts of the ACA support this hypothesis.253 Perhaps, then,
regulation of these areas was to be addressed in a different
part of the statute that never came to fruition.
Another common aspect of those areas left to state
regulation is that they lack political salience. Insurer rate
reserves, provider contracting, and utilization management—
whatever their importance to the actual functioning of a health
insurance carrier—are not the stuff of headlines.254 If one
subscribes to the view that legislating is politically costly—
particularly when done in the context of a heated partisan
battle—then perhaps Congress simply felt that addressing
these areas of regulation was not worth the required political
capital.255 Under this account, few voters would notice whether
these items were included in the bill, suggesting that any
political gains to be had would be modest at best, but that
missteps—which would greatly aggravate the insurance
industry—would be costly. Conversely, many of the areas that
Congress shifted to HHS’ regulatory jurisdiction are politically
significant. Plan pricing, guaranteed issue, employer cost
sharing, and the benefit design of plans all directly impact
253. See, e.g., Stephen M. Weiner, Payment Reform After PPACA: Is
Massachusetts Leading the Way Again?, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS
33, 34 (2011).
254. See Detlefsen, supra note 133, at 104 (noting that solvency
regulation is “technical and straightforward,” and does not implicate the
social-welfare questions raised by other aspects of insurance regulation).
255. See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action:
Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative
Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 11-12 (2008).
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consumers. Not coincidentally, reforms in these areas were the
ones most trumpeted by lawmakers after the passage of the
Act.
A third notable characteristic of the ACA’s allocation of
regulatory authority is that the functions Congress delegated
to HHS are those with which the federal government has the
most familiarity. As discussed in Part IV, the federal
government has had a hand in regulating market conduct in
the individual and group markets since at least 1996.256
Congress’ experience with HIPAA (and also the carriers’
experiences) may have emboldened it to regulate more
extensively in this area. As veterans of the HIPAA debates,
many of the members of the relevant committees of Congress
likely had greater familiarity with these market-conduct issues
than with other aspects of the statute. Moreover, HHS had the
benefit of fifteen years of promulgating market-conduct
regulations, perhaps increasing Congress’ confidence in HHS’
ability to be an effective regulator. Lastly, the states may have
been less likely to resist further incursion into these aspects of
their regulatory jurisdiction, as the HIPAA provisions had
already reduced their degrees of freedom.
The last thing that stands out about the ACA’s distribution
of regulatory functions is the significant role of the exchanges.
It is not immediately apparent why Congress thought it
appropriate to confer these functions—almost of all of which lie
within the traditional domain of state regulation—on the
exchanges. More significantly, it is unclear whether Congress
considered how much of the balance of federal and state
regulatory authority effectively rested on states’ decisions
whether to establish an exchange.
One obvious possibility is that Congress thought it was
leaving these functions with the states. That is, Congress fully
expected most states would decide to operate their own
exchange, which would effectively leave them in control of
these functions. But this account is unsatisfying. First, if
Congress wanted the states to perform these functions, why tie
them to the exchanges at all, instead of just remaining silent
about them? Second, in light of the political climate
256. See supra Part IV.B.
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surrounding the passage of the Act, it seems implausible that
Congress did not anticipate the possibility that states would
opt out of the exchanges. Thus, it seems unlikely that the
choice to vest the exchanges with these functions was in any
way accidental.
A second possibility is that Congress simply modeled the
provisions after the archetypal exchange—the Massachusetts
Health Connector—and gave the exchanges these functions
because that is what Massachusetts did.257 This too seems
unlikely. For one thing, section 1321 of the ACA creates a
presumption that exchanges operated by states before January
1, 2010 comply with the ACA’s requirements, but it also
provides for a review by the HHS Secretary to ensure
compliance.258 Thus, Congress at least entertained the
possibility that the Massachusetts exchange would differ in
meaningful ways from the statutory criteria. Further, the
exchanges were a widely publicized and debated aspect of the
ACA—it is therefore unlikely that Congress blindly applied the
Massachusetts model. A third possibility is that Congress
simply decided that these functions would be best performed by
the exchanges as independent entities. But the plain terms of
the Act, which characterize the exchanges as a state flexibility
measure,259 strongly suggest that Congress viewed the
exchanges as instrumentalities of the States.
Regardless of its reasons for vesting regulatory authority
in the exchanges, the fact that Congress did so raises an
important question: how did Congress think this allocation of
regulatory authority would interact with the states’ freedom to
opt out of creating their own exchange? The next section
canvasses the legislative history of the ACA for answers to this
question.
B. The Legislative History of the ACA’s Exchange Provision
The ACA’s drafting history offers few clues as to how
Congress believed the Act’s exchange provisions would impact
257. See Weiner, supra note 253, at 34-36.
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 18041(e) (2012).
259. See id. §§ 18041 to 18044.
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state regulatory authority. Much of what one can glean about
the exchanges from this history relates to the different versions
of the exchange provision drafted by the House and the Senate.
1. The House Bill’s Exchange Provisions
The version of the ACA that passed the House, called the
“Affordable Health Care for America Act,” contained a
dramatically different exchange provision than the provision
that Congress ultimately enacted. Rather than providing for
multiple state-based exchanges, the House bill created a single
federal exchange.260 This federal exchange was to perform
many of the same functions of the state-based exchanges that
were included in the ACA. For example, plans that were to be
sold on the exchange had to meet requirements regarding the
level of benefits offered,261 and the exchange was to perform a
plan certification function.262 Like the ACA as ultimately
passed, the exchange-related regulatory provisions in the
House bill covered both the content of health plans and the
manner in which they could be sold. Thus, the bill included
requirements affecting cost sharing, enrollment, risk pooling,
network adequacy, and compliance with state carrier licensure
rules.263
These provisions were consistent with lawmakers’
comments regarding the purpose of the exchange. The House
Ways and Means Committee, for example, took an expansive
view of the role of the exchange:
A Health Insurance Exchange . . . would be
established to facilitate access of individuals and
employers to a variety of choices of affordable,
quality health insurance coverage, including a
public health insurance option. . . . As described
260. See Affordable Health Care for America Act (AHCAA), H.R. 3962,
111th Cong. § 301(a) (2009).
261. See id. § 303 (requiring, inter alia, that plans be branded in three
tiers based on benefit levels, and that plans adhere to cost-sharing limits).
262. See id. § 304 (granting the exchange commissioner the power to
establish and enforce certification criteria).
263. See id. §§ 303 to 304.
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in greater detail in the following sections,. . . the
[Exchange] Commissioner would (1) establish
standards for, accept bids from, and negotiate
and enter into contracts with entities seeking to
offer qualified health benefits plans (QHBPs)
through the Exchange, (2) facilitate outreach and
enrollment of Exchange-eligible individuals and
employers, and (3) conduct appropriate activities
related to the Exchange, including establishment
of a risk pooling mechanism and consumer
protections.264
As this quotation makes clear, the House envisioned that the
exchange would do more than simply allow consumers to enroll
in a plan—it would play a central role in defining the set of
choices available to consumers, and would also undertake
certain functions—like risk pooling—that had long been the
province of state regulators.
Another notable aspect of the federal exchange proposed in
the House bill is the extent to which it is intertwined with the
proposed “public option.” The public option was a hotly
contested aspect of the House bill that created a governmentrun health plan that would compete with private carriers’
plans on the federal exchange.265 Both the structure of the
House bill—which places the exchange and public-option
provisions adjacent to each other—and House Committee
Reports suggest that the exchange and the public option were
closely related.266 This connection is perhaps unsurprising. The
264. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON H.R. 3200, H.R. REP.
NO. 111-299, pt. 2, at 229 (2009). Both the House Education and Labor
Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee took a nearly identical
view. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR ON H.R. 3200, H.R. REP.
NO. 111-299, pt. 3, at 116-17 (2009); REPORT OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE ON H.R. 3200, H.R. REP. 111-299, pt. 1, at 402 (2009).
265. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th
Cong. §§ 321 to 331 (2009) (providing for the creation and administration of
the public health insurance option). The public option proved to be one of the
most controversial proposals debated as part of the health reform package,
and was not included in the Senate bills or the ACA as passed.
266. For a non-exhaustive list of examples where the House highlighted
the relationship between the exchange and the public option, see H.R. REP.
111-299, at 318, 470, 402; H.R. REP. 111-299, at 78, 91, 95-96, 126; H.R. REP.
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exchange was to be the sole means through which consumers
could purchase plans under the public option, suggesting that
Congress viewed the national exchange as an indispensable
component of the public plan.267
Moreover, the bill suggests that the exchange regulations
were to form the basis upon which the public option would be
permitted to compete with private plans.268 Congress
envisioned that the public option would simply be one choice
among many—a federally sponsored plan that would compete
on level terms with private offerings.269 In order for this
competition to be “fair,” the statute needed a yardstick against
which to measure the content of both the public option plan
and the private plans. The exchange’s certification processes
provided this yardstick.270 Without this shared regulatory
framework, it would have been difficult to determine whether
public option plans were truly comparable to those offered in
the private market.
The House bill did contain an alternative to the federal
exchange. Under section 308 of the bill, states could apply for
permission to create their own exchanges to replace the federal
exchange in their state.271 Even this provision, however,
conferred only limited authority on the states. The
Commissioner in charge of the federal exchange was vested
with the power to approve or deny the creation of state
exchanges.272 The bill sets out several conditions for this
approval, but also grants the Commissioner tremendous
discretion to determine whether a state exchange passes
muster: it subjects approval to compliance with “[s]uch other

111-299, at 198, 201-02, 229, 239.
267. See Affordable Health Care for America Act (AHCAA), H.R. 3962,
111th Cong. § 321(b)(1) (2009) (“The public health insurance option shall only
be made available through the Health Insurance Exchange.”).
268. See id. § 100(a)(3)(B).
269. See id.
270. Id. § 321(b)(2) (the “public health insurance option shall comply
with requirements that are applicable under this title to an Exchangeparticipating health benefits plan, including requirements related to benefits,
benefit levels, provider networks, notices, consumer protections, and costsharing.”).
271. See id. § 308.
272. See id.
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requirements as the Commissioner may specify.”273 Moreover,
even after the Commissioner approves a state exchange, the
Commissioner retains authority to define which functions the
state exchange may perform and which will remain under
federal control.274
In sum, the House’s exchange provisions suggested a
model in which the federal government would use its exchange
to exercise a significant degree of control over both the terms of
plans available to consumers and the means through which
consumers could enroll in them. Far from being a means of
allowing states to retain regulatory control or flexibility, the
single federal exchange was to be a means imposing
uniformity, in part to carry the new public option into
operation. Under the House bill, the exchange had little to do
with balancing state and federal regulatory authority. Rather,
the bill as a whole envisioned a near-complete shift of that
authority to the federal government, with the exchange serving
as the vehicle through which the federal government would
exercise its new authority. By contrast, the Senate bill—and
the ACA as eventually passed—eschewed the creation of a
national exchange, seemingly intending to vest the exchanges’
powers in the states.

273. Id. § 308(b)(1)(E).
274. See id. § 308(d). The Bill defines the Commissioner’s relationship to
approved state exchanges as follows:
(d) RETENTION OF AUTHORITY.—
(1) AUTHORITY RETAINED.—Enforcement authorities of
the Commissioner shall be retained by the Commissioner.
(2)
DISCRETION
TO
RETAIN
ADDITIONAL
AUTHORITY.—The Commissioner may specify functions of
the Health Insurance Exchange that—
(A) may not be performed by a State-based Health
Insurance Exchange under this section; or
(B) may be performed by the Commissioner and by
such a State-based Health Insurance Exchange.
Id.
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2. The Senate Bill’s Exchange Provisions
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that it formed the basis of
the engrossed bill, the Senate bill’s exchange provisions closely
track those in the ACA as enacted. Indeed, the Conference
Committee made no significant changes to the Senate bill’s
exchange provisions.275 Given this similarity, evidence of what
the Senate thought regarding the consequences of states failing
to establish their own exchanges is highly probative of the
Congress’ ultimate views about the ACA and state regulatory
authority.
Unfortunately, the history of the Senate bill reveals little
about what Congress thought would happen if states did not
create their own exchanges. The most useful commentary on
this point is from the Senate Finance Committee’s report: “If
states do not establish these exchanges within 2 years of
enactment (or if the Secretary determines the exchanges will
not be operational by July 1, 2013), the Secretary would be
required to contract with a nongovernmental entity to establish
the exchanges within the state.”276 This comment suggests that
the Committee did not necessarily imagine that the alternative
to a state-based exchange would be a federal one; rather, it
suggests that the federal government would set up a state
exchange to be run by an entity other than the uncooperative
state government. This implies that the Committee imagined
that exchange regulations would remain state specific, and
provides some support for the notion that the Senate did not
expect the optional character of the exchanges to have a
significant effect on the distribution of regulatory authority
between the state and federal government.
This inference is consistent with a provision in the version
of the bill reported out of the Finance Committee that provided
for contractual allocation of exchange functions between the

275. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, PUB. L.
NO. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see also Farhana Hossain, Proposed Changes to the Final Health
Care
Bill,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/19/us/politics/20100319-healthcare-reconciliation.html?_r=0#tab=1 (last updated Mar. 22, 2010).
276. S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 18-19 (2009).
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federal government, the states, and their exchanges.277 The
provision, which was dropped from the version of the bill
ultimately approved by the Senate, provided: “The Secretary
shall enter into an agreement with each State (in this section
referred to as the ‘agreement’) setting forth which of the
functions described in this section with respect to an exchange
shall be performed by the Secretary, the State, or the
exchange.”278 Critically, this sentence was in the section of the
bill that described all of the major functions of the exchanges:
plan certification, establishment of a call center and internet
portal, establishment of tiered ratings for plans, administration
of eligibility criteria, and enrollment.279 Neither the bill nor the
Committee Report elaborates the required terms of an
agreement to allocate these functions.
Whatever its contours, the existence of the agreement
provision suggests that the Committee imagined states would
have the express option to retain control of the exchangeadministered functions. Indeed, under this provision, it
appears that a state would have had the option—subject to the
federal government’s assent—to pick those exchange functions
the state wished to assume and to effectively delegate the
others to the federal government. At a minimum, this impulse
seems at odds with the way the ACA’s exchange provisions
have played out in practice—as a take-it-or-leave-it option that
demands states either create their own exchange or forfeit
regulatory authority to HHS.
To recap, the legislative history of the ACA reveals little
about what Congress understood about the impact of the
exchange provisions on state regulatory authority. At best, the
differences between the House and Senate bills—which
revolved around whether there would be one or more
exchanges—suggest that the question of state regulatory
jurisdiction was orthogonal to the issues at the fore of
Congressional minds. Regardless of what Congress intended,
however, the exchange provisions (and the ACA more broadly)

277. See America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong.
§ 2236 (2009).
278. Id. § 2236(a).
279. See id. § 2236(b)-(d).
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do considerably alter the scope of state regulatory authority.
The next section turns to the consequences of this shift.
C. A Step Toward Federal Insurance Chartering?
As discussed above, the ACA’s assignment of regulatory
functions confers authority over most of the politically salient
aspects of health insurance regulation to HHS, assigns the
bulk of the consumer-facing functions to the exchanges, and
leaves several technical areas within state purview. The
reasons why Congress wanted to federalize the politically
sensitive judgments seems relatively clear—regulation of topics
like rating and guaranteed issue is an essential element of the
statute’s goal of expanding health coverage to the entire
population. The legislative history of the exchange provisions
suggests that the assignment of the exchange-related
regulatory functions was less deliberate, as Congress did not
seem to contemplate the possibility that the states would fail to
set up their own exchanges. Nonetheless, that legislative
history rightly suggests that the functions assigned to the
exchanges are important ones, and will have a significant
impact on the overall health insurance market. In sum, the
ACA has created a system where the federal government
controls many of the core aspects of health insurance
regulation. And in half of the states—those that have not
established their own exchanges—it will control nearly every
regulatory function, save solvency, provider contracting, and
utilization management.
What then are the implications of this new order? The
balance of this paper suggests that the ACA has created a
scheme that resembles one envisaged by proposals to create an
optional federal insurance chartering system. After briefly
summarizing the content of these proposals, the paper
concludes with a discussion of the long-term consequences of
the ACA’s regulatory scheme.
1. Optional Federal Insurance Chartering
For at least the last forty years, there has been an ongoing
debate between carriers, states, and the federal government
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about whether the insurance industry and consumers are well
served by state regulation.280 Specifically, the debate has been
about whether the United States should regulate insurance the
way it regulates the banking, securities, and other financial
industries, all of which are primarily subject to federal
regulation.
Criticism of the state-based system proceeds along two
lines. First, some carriers contend that state regulation forces
them to navigate an unduly complex patchwork of sometimesconflicting state regulations, which raises costs and makes it
difficult to do business across state lines.281 Under this view,
there are significant economies of scale to be achieved by
standardizing regulatory requirements, which would allow
carriers to reduce their spending on compliance.282 Moreover,
proponents of this view argue that standardizing regulatory
requirements would greatly ease carriers’ ability to bring new
products to market, which will result in innovation that
benefits both carriers and consumers.283 Lastly, the argument
goes, society receives little benefit from the heterogeneity of
insurance regulations, suggesting that the regulations cost
carriers dearly and benefit consumers little.284
The second set of criticisms of state-based insurance
regulation comes from a different direction. Some have argued
that it has been an uneven protector of consumers’ interests.
Specifically, the system has been criticized as failing to provide
adequate information to consumers, to ensure that insurance

280. The first serious discussion of federal insurance chartering dates to
1969. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 91; see also Martin F. Grace &
Robert W. Klein, The Future of Insurance Regulation: An Introduction, in
THE FUTURE OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 18,
at 1-4 (situating the federal chartering debate in the context of arguments
about the proper allocation of regulatory authority dating to the Civil War).
281. See Elizabeth F. Brown, Will the Federal Insurance Office Improve
Insurance Regulation?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 560-79 (2012) (summarizing,
in the context of CDO regulation, criticisms of state insurance regulation);
Grace & Scott, supra note 129, at 58-66; Ernest T. Patrikis, Optional Federal
Chartering for Property and Casualty Companies, in OPTIONAL FEDERAL
CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 47, 47-50 (Peter J.
Wallison ed., 2000); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 96-101.
282. See Grace & Scott, supra note 129, at 60.
283. See id. at 66.
284. See id. at 61.
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markets are competitive, to effectively regulate brokers and
other producers, and to enforce regulations when they are
violated.285
Many have suggested that the best way to solve these
problems would be to create a system of optional federal
insurance chartering.286 Under such a scheme, which would be
modeled on the system of banking regulation,287 carriers would
have the option to either continue under the current scheme of
state licensing or to apply for a single federal license.288 Of
course, any federal chartering system would enlarge the role of
federal regulators at the expense of the states.
A brief overview of the components of an optional federal
insurance chartering system suggests the ways in which such a
system resembles the ACA. The most recent legislative attempt
to establish a federal chartering system provides a useful
example of how a federal chartering system would work.
The 2007 National Insurance Act (“NIA”) was a bill
considered—and ultimately abandoned—in the United States
Senate.289 The NIA, which would have been a major overhaul of
non-health insurance regulation, sought “to establish a
comprehensive system of Federal chartering, licensing,
regulation, and supervision for insurers and insurance
producers that is independent of the State system . . . , yet that
requires federally chartered and licensed insurers and
producers to comply with certain State laws, including State
tax laws.”290 The NIA proposed an “Office of National
Insurance,” which was to oversee all aspects of federal

285. See J. Robert Hunter, A Consumer Perspective, in OPTIONAL
FEDERAL CHARTERING AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note
281, at 177, 182-84. But see Grace & Scott, supra note 129, at 72-73 (noting
that a federal regulator may be less attentive to consumer needs than local
regulators, which may be held more directly accountable for their
responsiveness to citizen queries).
286. Cf. Randall, supra note 15, at 628, 687 (arguing that in the absence
of a move to federal chartering, the current state-based regulatory system
should be reformed).
287. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at 94.
288. See id. at 96 (summarizing carrier’s licensing options under the
proposed 2007 National Insurance Act).
289. National Insurance Act of 2007, S. 40, 110th Cong. (2007).
290. Id. § 2.
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insurance regulation and issue the new national charters.291
The agency would have power to regulate policy forms, which
include the definition of policy terms, solvency standards,
underwriting standards, and sales and marketing practices.292
In other words, the agency would exercise almost all of the
powers traditionally reserved to state regulators. Importantly,
the Act would displace state regulation of national insurers in
these areas:
Except as authorized by this Act or otherwise
authorized under Federal law, national insurers,
national agencies, and federally licensed
insurance producers shall not be subject to any
form of licensing, examination, reporting,
regulation, or other supervision relating to—
(1) the sale, solicitation, or negotiation of
insurance;
(2) the underwriting of insurance; or
(3) any other insurance operations.293
The ACA resembles the National Insurance Act system in
a number of important respects. As discussed above,294 the
ACA contains a provision authorizing the creation of multiState QHPs. Recall that states are obliged to allow these plans
to operate within their jurisdiction.295 Recall also that these
QHPs are subject only to regulations imposed by state
exchanges and state laws that do not conflict with the ACA’s
multi-State QHP requirements.296 When considered alongside
291. See id. §§ 1101 to 02.
292. See id. §§ 1212, 1214 to 15; see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 29, at
95-98 (summarizing the key terms of the bill). Interestingly, the agency
would not have the authority to regulate rating practices. See S. 40, 110th
Cong. § 1215(d) (“The Act does not authorize the Commissioner to require a
national insurer to use any particular rate, rating element, price, or form.”).
Coupled with the Act’s preemption prevision, this section of the bill would
appear to preclude all regulation of property and casualty rating practices.
See id. § 1703.
293. Id. § 1125(a).
294. See supra Part V.D.
295. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
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the fact that the federal government will run an exchange
serving half the states—making it a natural choice for plans
seeking QHP certification—the system very closely resembles
the NIA’s federal licensure scheme. To wit, plans can opt either
to pursue licensing on a state-by-state basis, either through the
individual state exchanges or outside the exchanges through
pre-ACA regulatory processes, or may opt to seek certification
as a multi-State QHP through the federal exchange.297
Importantly, the fact that the federal government will be
running its own exchange means that this power—which would
have belonged to the states—is shared with the federal
government. Moreover, if multi-State QHP issuers wish to
standardize their offerings as much as possible, as the debate
about federal chartering suggests they will,298 the federal
exchange will have far more influence than any single state, as
it will set plan standards in twenty-six states.
Beyond plan licensing, there are other similarities between
the ACA and the NIA scheme. Many of the functions performed
by the ACA exchanges, which regulate the consumer-facing
aspects of the insurance business, resemble functions that
would be vested in a federal consumer protection regulator
under the NIA.299 The federally run exchange will in effect
function as such a federal consumer protection regulator in
twenty-six states.
There are, however, several notable differences between
the ACA and the NIA. As noted above, the ACA does not
undertake regulation of carrier solvency, which represents a
significant component of the NIA.300 Further, the NIA does not
undertake regulation of health-specific insurance issues, such
as guaranteed issue rules or employer cost sharing

297. See supra Part V.D.
298. See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text. Note that the ACA’s
provision allowing the establishment of multi-State QHPs will also encourage
standardization, at least among the largest carriers. See supra notes 241-42
and accompanying text.
299. See S. 40, 110th Cong. §§ 1105, 1216 (2007) (establishing a
“Division of Consumer Affairs” within the Office of National Insurance
charged with regulating sales and marketing practices); ZIMMERMAN, supra
note 29, at 97-98 (summarizing consumer-protection aspects of the NIA).
300. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text; S. 40, 110th Cong.
§§ 1212 to 13, 1601 to 12.
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requirements. Lastly, the ACA does not include a sweeping
express preemption provision like that in the NIA.
Nonetheless, the broad strokes of both statutory schemes are
quite similar.
2. A View of the Future?
Situating the ACA in the context of the NIA and broader
debates about the propriety of state-based insurance regulation
highlights the extent to which the ACA represents a marked
change in the health insurance regulatory landscape. As the
Act is carried into implementation over the next few years,
beginning with the commencement of exchange operations in
October 2013, it is likely to have a significant impact on the
future of state health insurance regulation and on the
regulation of insurance more broadly.
First, the ACA will function as a proof-of-concept of federal
insurance chartering. As discussed above, the federally run
exchange that will operate in twenty-six states,301 along with
the Act’s multistate licensing provisions,302 effectively create a
federal plan licensing option. If this option proves to be popular
with carriers and consumers, it will lend support to the
proponents of federal insurance chartering, both in health
insurance and in other lines. Carriers’ perception of this option
will be particularly important. If the regime lowers their
regulatory compliance costs and makes it easier for them to
offer plans across state lines, that experience may embolden
non-health carriers to push harder for a similar regime in other
insurance markets. With respect to health insurance, if
carriers and consumers prefer the federally run exchanges to
state-offered options, this may create pressure over the long
term to converge on a single federal exchange. This end could
be achieved either by amending the ACA to make it more
closely resemble the House version of the Act, or by states
simply opting to shut down their exchanges. Thus, the ACA
will serve as a testing ground for optional federal insurance
chartering.
301. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Part V.D.
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Second, between the functions the ACA directly vests in
HHS and those it vests in the exchanges (which the federal
government will assume in half the states), the ACA will force
the federal government to build competency in insurance
regulation. While there have been proposals, like those in the
NIA, for the federal government to assume insurance
regulation functions, the ACA marks the first time that the
federal government will actually have to build these
capabilities. If history is any guide, the creation of this
expertise at the federal level may lead to a further expansion of
federal regulatory authority in the future. Consider, for
example, the relationship between HIPAA’s insurance market
reforms and the provisions of the ACA. Many of the areas
where the ACA most dramatically expanded the federal
government’s role—such as rating, guaranteed issue, and risk
pooling in the individual and small-group markets—are areas
where HIPAA had already established some form of federal
regulation.303 By contrast, areas where the federal government
had no prior regulatory role—such as the regulation of
insurance producers—were left to the states. If this pattern
holds true with respect to the federal regulatory capabilities
created by the ACA, Congress may be more comfortable
creating an expanded federal role in these areas through future
legislation.
Lastly, the ACA may mark the beginning of a gradual
erosion of the role of state insurance regulators.304 If indeed the
national licensing provisions and the federal exchange prove
popular, an increasing proportion of the individual and smallgroup business may shift to these federal channels. As noted
earlier, these markets are the only significant portions of the
health insurance business that remain under state control
after ERISA.305 Thus, should these areas shift to a system of
federal regulation, states would be left to regulate very little of
the health insurance market. Moreover, as suggested earlier,

303. See supra Part IV.C.
304. Cf. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 14, at 17-18
(“The specific activities CMS will undertake in each of the state-based and
partnership exchanges may continue to change if states do not make
adequate progress toward completion of their required activities.”).
305. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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the success of federal regulation in the health insurance
business may generate pressure for federal chartering in
property and casualty and other lines of insurance. Currently,
regulation of these other lines is the bread-and-butter of state
insurance agencies, but it is not implausible—especially in
light of the NIA and other federal chartering efforts—that
these functions may one day migrate to a federal agency. The
ACA may be the beginning of that process.
D. An Accidental—and Flawed—Model
Consumers and insurance carriers both stand to lose a
great deal by a shift toward federal regulation. The loss is
clearest in health insurance. Many aspects of health insurance
make it an ideal candidate for state-based regulation. In some
ways, the ACA’s allocation of regulatory authority reflects this
reality. Some of the elements of health insurance regulation
that would benefit most from state-based authority, such as
rate review, plan certification, and regulation of marketing
practices, are assigned to the exchanges.
Allowing these functions to quietly shift to the federal
government because of states’ failure to create their own
exchanges would be a mistake. Federal administration of these
functions, even if only in half the states at the outset, will
quickly result in greater homogenization. As discussed above,
this will stymie the trial-and-error process of regulatory
innovation in the states, degrade consumers’ and firms’ ability
to influence the content of regulation, result in less-efficient
regulation, and forego the benefits of state experience.306 Worse
yet, the benefits normally associated with regulatory
standardization, such as reduced compliance costs, ease of
doing business across state lines, and consistent consumer
protection standards,307 are unlikely to materialize under the
ACA. A federal exchange will set standards for roughly half of
the states, but the remaining twenty-four states will remain
free to adopt their own, potentially conflicting rules. This kind
of regulatory clash is all but assured, as the PPACA’s exchange
306. See supra Part III.D.
307. See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
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provisions do not contain any preemption clauses that would
displace conflicting state laws. Even states served by the
federal exchange could, in some areas, adopt conflicting rules.
The resulting regulatory collision will blunt any positive
impacts of standardization, leaving behind a worst-of-bothworlds outcome in which the benefits of state regulation are
sacrificed for naught.
Even those who do not subscribe to the view that there is
value in regulatory federalism should be concerned that the
ACA’s provisions work an unintended shift of authority to the
federal government. It may be that such a shift is tolerable,
even desirable, but it is difficult to say for sure without
debating the alternatives. This is particularly true given there
is no inherent reason why all of the functions assigned to the
exchanges must be administered by the same regulator. For
example, one could imagine a regime in which the states
maintain control over provider contracting, but the federal
government handles consumer-protection issues like plan
certification and marketing regulation. The accidental nature
of the ACA’s allocation of regulatory authority all but precludes
consideration of this and other alternatives.
As for non-health lines of insurance, proponents of a
federal charter should pause before they trumpet the ACA as a
model of what might work elsewhere. If indeed health
insurance regulation starts to resemble the NIA scheme, it will
be by accident, and not by design. If there is to be a broader
shift to federal regulation of insurance, it ought to be
deliberate.
***
Perhaps, then, Mississippi insurance commissioner Mike
Chaney was right: Governor Bryant’s refusal to set up a state
exchange in an effort to score political points for opposing the
implementation of the ACA was shortsighted. What Governor
Bryant and others failed to appreciate was that issues of much
greater significance turned on the decision whether to create
an exchange. Lost in the shuffle of debates about the public
option and efforts to stymie the implementation of
“Obamacare,” the significance of the exchanges to the broader
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allocation of insurance regulatory authority seems to have
escaped attention. This oversight will prove consequential in
the health insurance industry, which will experience a
reallocation of authority from the states to the federal
government. It may also catalyze a broader erosion of state
regulatory authority. There is good reason to think that these
changes are wrongheaded. At minimum, however, they should
not be undertaken blindly.
VII. Conclusion
The ACA’s health insurance regulation provisions make
clear that the Act works a transformation of the institutional
structure of health insurance regulation. As the ACA takes full
effect over the next year, the federal government, either
through HHS or the new federal exchange, will assume
responsibility for a significant portion of the regulation of
health insurance. Rate review, rating regulations, plan benefit
design, network standards, market-conduct requirements, and
consumer-facing distribution will all come under a significant
degree of federal control.
Significantly, much of this authority will be exercised
through the new federal exchange. By providing the states the
option whether to create their own exchange—a choice made in
the name of preserving state authority—Congress thus paved
the way for a more dramatic shift in regulatory authority than
it likely intended. In fact, the defeat of the House’s version of
the Act—and its overt federalization of the exchange
functions—signaled a desire to avoid precisely this result.
Regardless of whether it is the product of careful design or
unintended consequences, the presence of a federal exchange in
half the states, along with the ACA’s other regulatory
provisions, will represent a clear departure from the past
century of insurance regulation. In health insurance markets,
this shift will be costly. At best, consumers and carriers will
lose the benefits associated with a state-based regulatory
regime, but will not gain the benefits of a uniform national
system. At worst, they may experience market disruptions
caused by an inexperienced federal regulator. And it is likely
that the effects of the ACA will not be limited to health
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insurance. It may come to pass that Congress’ decision to
provide states with flexibility, and Republican Governors’
attempt to use that flexibility to frustrate federal regulatory
expansion, may form the unlikely crucible of a new regime of
national insurance regulation.
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